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Abstract 
 In 1923, Kemal Atatürk began his modernization project that was to bring Turkey to the ranks of 
“civilized nations.”  In doing so, he utilized modernity as a political tool, a method that would be adapted 
by other domestic actors in a similar fashion.  This thesis argues that as a result of this legacy, there has 
been no true political project based on modernization or democratization in Turkey.  Modernity, when 
used as a political tool, rather than an end in itself, cannot be delivered.  In this case, the governing 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Atatürk’s Kemalism are similar to each other, in that their 
plans for modernity fell short because they became distracted by their own limitations.  Understanding 
domestic politics in this light, the EU worsens the domestic situation of modernity; it can be 
counterproductive, furthering societal divides and therefore also failing to deliver modernity.  This 
argument is made through the historical examination of modernity through Kemalism, how that concept 
and legacy has effected the AKP and their use of modernity as a political tool, and in conjunction with 
those two parties, how the EU affects Turkish domestic politics.   
Kemalism’s lasting concept of modernity is a loaded notion and influences all other conceptions 
of modernity discussed in Turkey.  Currently the debate exists between Kemalists, the AKP, and even the 
EU where each group claims to represent the path to a more modern Turkey.  Through the utilization of 
modernity, they have found the perfect tool for political gain and influence.   
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Introduction 
Modern Turkey.  Rarely is one country so permanently branded with such a loaded descriptor 
that is used not as much for clarification, but as a component of identity.  Yet, the idea of a “Modern 
Turkey” immediately draws attention to its vast anomalies.  It draws a distinct line between what Turkey 
is and is not; separate from the “unmodern” Ottoman Empire before it, yet still connected to its 
meaningful history; distinct from the traditional societies of the Middle East, but still not an accepted 
member of the Europe club.  The list could continue.  Though, if Turkey is truly a modern country, why 
must its discussion be prefaced with a descriptor that should be inherently understood? 
The answer of the anomalous modern Turkey lies in its founding and ongoing, yet still 
incomplete modernization efforts coupled with the shifting meanings of what modernity entails.  With 
the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, a massive modernization 
project was begun.  The idea that Turkey could be transformed from a disgraced Ottoman remnant on 
the wrong side of the Great War into a fully modern nation of Turks was Atatürk’s greatest dream.  This 
dream set the stage for Turkey’s great modernization debate, a dispute that is livelier today than ever.  
It is a conversation that occurs not only within Turkey, but is also disputed internationally by social and 
political organizations who hope to have a stake in Turkey’s future, or at least utilize its long-term 
stability and continue to encourage its democratization efforts. 
The parties fueling the ongoing topic of Turkey’s modernity represent three camps of influence 
within Turkey’s domestic political scene.  Each group uses modernity as a political tool, invoked to 
persuade, direct, and control Turkey’s political direction.  And while such attempts at directing the 
political course is not uncommon in any state, the conflict for influence in Turkey is different.  Turkey is 
currently a nation at a crossroads.  It is at the doorstep of Europe, accepted as a close neighbor, but not 
yet allowed to enter Europe’s great club, the European Union (EU).  This place in limbo has been 
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exacerbated between two distinct camps competing for influence internally, leading to mixed messages 
on whether EU membership is right for Turkey as well as how far Turkey is willing to go to be accepted.   
The current governing party, the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, has been in power at 
this point for over a decade, since its massive electoral victory in 2002.  The past 12 years has illustrated 
a distinct split in the conversation and identity of modernity in Turkey.  However, while the AKP has 
introduced a new and popular political option, those representing the Kemalist line of thought have 
continued to fight to maintain its own vision of the true path of Turkey.  As it was in the beginning, the 
hope of a modern Turkey drives the political conversation.  The conflict between the AKP and Kemalists 
is heightened by the presence of an outside third party, the EU.  Each group has a different vision for 
Turkey, leading to tense political conflicts and leaving the visions of Turkey’s future as a modern nation 
in limbo.   
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
 The use of modernity as a political tool is not a new concept in Turkey.  Atatürk’s project of 
modernization was first and foremost a political tool.  A tool necessary to create total and lasting change 
that would lead Turkey to the status of a modern, Western state.  Yet this concept of modernity is a 
laden idea.  It doesn’t maintain just one definition, and in the context of Turkey, different parties have 
different ideas and meanings of this one word.  Yet each can use the word to advantage their own 
agendas, and also to the detriment another party by utilizing one or more meanings of the word. 
Because of this interpretation and use and modernity, there has been no true political project 
based on modernization or democratization in Turkey. When used as a political tool, rather than an end 
in itself, modernity cannot be delivered.  In this case, the AKP and Kemalism are similar to each other, in 
that their plans for modernity fell short because they struggled to overcome modernity’s political 
limitations.  Full modernity and full democracy cannot ensure political power, and so the quest for 
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modernity is really a quest to gain and maintain control, and cannot actually deliver.  Understanding 
domestic politics in this light, the presence of the EU worsens the situation; it can be counterproductive, 
furthering societal divides and therefore also failing to deliver modernity.  
To begin, the oldest and most engrained concept of modernity begins with Atatürk.  Atatürk’s 
vision for the Turkish nation was very specific, and for several years pushed forward many different 
progressive projects based on joining Turkey to the ranks of “Civilized Nations” (Glyptis, 
“Rapprochement” 411).   Atatürk’s plan for the future was officially expressed in the Six Arrows of 
Kemalism at a conference of his political party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) in 1931.  Fortifying 
the nation for decades to come would be the belief in Secularism, Republicanism, Nationalism and the 
Protection of the Revolutionary Reforms.  Though the principles of Populism and Statism are no longer 
considered essential, their neglect can be seen as a consequence of Turkey’s growth and an updated 
vision of what the state apparatus can truly control. 
  And while Kemalist theory is still represented by a political party and the military establishment, 
its presence, representation, and most importantly belief goes much deeper.  Iconic pictures of Atatürk 
are everywhere: in shops, restaurants, homes and offices.  The celebration of Kemalism has been 
presented in a way that is comparable to a religion by some, pointing out the similarities in the way in 
which Atatürk is thought of and remembered.  In exploring modern critics of Kemalism, Karaveli 
examines the relationship between religion and Kemalism and discusses how journalist Etyen 
Mahçupyan sees “that Kemalism has become a full-fledged religion, replete with its prophet, sacred 
texts, shrine, and appurtenant rituals” (94).  Due to the very nature of Kemalism, a deep-seated political 
theory and way of thinking and feeling about the nation, the followers of Kemalism, or Kemalists, as 
they will be referred to for the purpose of this research paper, are a difficult group to clearly identify.   
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The Turkish domestic political party that identifies as Kemalist is the Republican People’s Party 
(CHP), just as it was at the Republic’s founding.  However, as previously stated, Kemalism is more than 
just a political party or theory, its meaning permeates more than one’s partisan affiliation.  Atatürk 
initially ensured a complete separation of the military and politics, banning all serving military members 
or those attending military schools from being able to maintain a position in parliament or even vote in 
elections (Lerner and Robinson 20).  Set forth in the 1923 Constitution, these same laws apply today.  
Nevertheless, as it was Atatürk’s position as a military commander that allowed him to rise to power, 
the Turkish military always maintained an important position in society.  And though Atatürk made clear 
that the “civilianization” was essential to Turkey’s path as a modern nation, the biggest defender of 
Kemalism is no doubt the Turkish military (Lerner and Robinson 20).   
The Turkish military sees itself as the guardian of the Republic.  Turkey was purposefully created 
and designed by Atatürk so that it would become a truly modern nation on par with the West.  Atatürk 
did not believe that Turkey would achieve greatness without guidance, and so the military, while 
apolitical, performed essential societal duties.  This allowed the Turkish military to be a respected and 
revered institution, which is essential in understanding its current role as the modern protectors of 
Kemalism.  Atatürk’s image, in uniform, appears on the masthead of the Army’s website.  Turkey’s 
military schools educate incoming officers in a strict manner, ensuring that the principles of Kemalism 
will continue to be upheld, cementing the Turkish military as guardians of the Turkish Republic (Ersel).   
And while the military’s role in the new Republic was designed by Atatürk to remain separate 
from politics, it is important to note that this does not mean that the military has adhered to this 
restriction.  The military has chosen to directly involve itself in politics several times through Turkey’s 
history since the first military coup in 1960.  And though the military has always returned power to new 
democratically elected governments, its decision to intervene is important in understanding 
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contemporary interpretations of Kemalism that play a role in how the discussion of modernity is 
perceived domestically. 
 The role of Kemalism as the backbone of Turkish society has never before been questioned as 
strongly as it is today.  Plans of Westernizing and looking towards Europe culminated in hopes for joining 
the EU; a step that could be seen as the pinnacle of Turkey’s status of a modern nation.  However, just 
when Turkey’s EU journey began to appear as a possibility, it seemed that this dream might not be so 
sweet.  Joining the EU requires sacrifice and change that targets the very heart of Kemalism, what 
Glyptis has even called a “Clash of Systemic Values.”  To cloud the situation further, the rise of a new 
political party, the AKP, has added a new prospect for Turkey’s future.  Each group claims to represent 
the path to a more modern Turkey (“Rapprochement”).  Through the utilization of modernity, Kemalists, 
the EU, and the AKP have found the perfect tool for political gain and influence, and its use and direction 
must be analyzed to understand where Turkey’s future may lay.   
The concept of modernity is, even at its simplest, is difficult to articulate.  While there have been 
scholars who have attempted to define modernity “in terms of a finite and distinct set of pattern 
variables,” I feel that this type of definition fails to take into account the fluidity and subjective nature of 
modernity (Bozdoğan and Kasaba 19).  Even in the West, where the foundation for modernization was 
formed and is therefore still used as the model against which those who have not yet achieved status as 
a “modern” nation are judged, there are more criteria than simply measurable economic factors.  
Various aspects of social life are also widely considered in the question of what modernity looks like, but 
those cannot always be measured as clearly as economic data (though there are helpful statistical 
indicators for ways of evaluating “modern” social conditions.)   
Within the context of this essay, there is no single definition of modernity.  It is the nature of 
Turkish modernity that allows this type of open exploration.  Turkey’s base of modernity comes directly 
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from Kemalism, but more importantly, the implications of Turkey’s historical Kemalist legacy influences 
more recent notions of modernity as advocated by the AKP, and provides an explanation for the 
difficulties in negotiations surrounding certain domestic issues between Turkey and the EU.  I will be 
examining Turkish modernity as a political conception, recognizing that is deeply entwined with Turkish 
national and even personal identity.  This analysis allows identity to be a component of modernity, but 
within the context of domestic politics, the conversation around modernity is just as if not more 
important than identity.  In searching for political power, the goal is not always to talk about who we 
are, but to utilize modernity as a tool to guide where we are going, which I believe is a much more 
powerful political conception. 
I will be examining the different utilizations and interpretations of modernity by Kemalists, the 
EU, and the AKP.  Understanding how this political tool is employed by each actor is important in 
measuring where Turkey’s current political preferences rest, and more importantly, where they may 
likely be headed.  The present contested visions of modernity in Turkey are not subtle or minor 
concerns.  There is currently a very serious unease domestically about Turkey’s future; and when adding 
the EU question into the mix, the stakes are quite high.  Understanding if Turkey’s modern future truly 
looks West, or if it will forever remain a simple bridge between East and West is an important question 
to all parties involved, and merits appropriate consideration.   
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The discussion of Turkish modernity has been alive and well since the establishment of the 
Republic.  Atatürk’s modernization project and general overhaul of Turkish culture, society, and 
government did not escape attention.  It was clear from the beginning that Atatürk’s ideas were meant 
to propel Turkey forward for the sake of creating and strengthening a great nation, as opposed to 
personal gain. This has led to the notion of Turkish modernity to be debated and analyzed many times 
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over, yet the debate is still relevant and important due to the changes within the past two decades that 
have seemingly permanently altered the recent Turkish modernity debate.   
To understand the challenges that Turkey has been facing in the modernity debates, it is 
essential to understand the basis of Turkey’s modernity status quo.  The original concept of modernity 
can be found in Kemalism; the original, and usually radical, changes that Atatürk set out to transform 
Turkey with.  From before the time that the Republic of Turkey had been proclaimed, Atatürk publicly 
declared he was creating “a new state” (Ahmad 52).  And this idea of a completely new state he was 
very serious about, working hard to ensure he would win the power struggle after the abolition of the 
Sultanate. Atatürk’s mission was to ensure that Turkey be wholly separated from the Ottoman Islamic 
state, the very idea of which Ahmad declares “anathema to Mustafa Kemal and his supporters.”  Any 
further continuation of the old way would only “maintain the status quo and perpetuate the 
backwardness of Turkey” (53).  It was removing this “backwardness” and paving the way to an entirely 
new future that Kemalist modernity was truly about. 
When Atatürk began formulating his vision for the new Republic, he was planning around “a 
population that was 90 per cent Muslim, but ethnically mixed, impoverished and numerically 
decimated” (Zürcher 136). However, through population exchanges and other migrations, the 
demographics of what would become his new Turkey was still shifting rapidly.  At the beginning of this 
new Republic, proclaimed on October 29, 1923, Turkey was now a state with an astonishing 98 percent 
Muslim population facing a perplexing shift to an overall greater proportion of rural inhabitants.  With 
the large Christian and ethnically diverse urbanized populations who had been largely in control of the 
modern economy gone from Turkey, Atatürk’s modernization plan was starting from an enormously 
challenging position (140).  
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Atatürk’s first objective was to separate the Republic of Turkey from its Ottoman roots.  This 
involved not only creating a new government structure, but also a new social order.  As Zürcher saw it, 
Atatürk’s mission was essentially to change the mentality of Turks, “who had thought of themselves as 
Muslim subjects of an Islamic empire,” to simply that of ‘Turks’ (141).  This was much more than a 
simple “modernization project,” as one might think of in today’s more general terms (usually involving a 
change to market economies and democracy).  Kemalism’s conception of modernity required the 
identity change of an entire population.  
 Though Kemalism was a massive project, its aims can be broken down into two basic goals.  
Zürcher characterizes the first goal as “To turn this mass of people [Turks] into a nation, to make citizens 
out of subjects and to install a sense of patriotism” (136).  Kemalism’s deep roots in Turkish society can 
be attributed to its role in the creation of the Turkish Republic.  Nationalism and a strong belief in the 
unity, strength, and purpose of Turks was the foundation on which Atatürk could build his 
modernization project.  The second goal of Kemalism concerns how Atatürk wished to shape the Turks 
of his new nation.  Kemalism’s purpose “was to make society ‘modern’ (musair) and ‘civilized’ (medeni).  
Both of these terms, which at times, were used as synonyms, referred to contemporary European 
civilization” (Zürcher 136).  So the hopes of Turkish modernity are intertwined with the identity that 
Kemalism hoped to adopt: a purely European identity.  Kemalism was an ideological transformation 
towards Western standards where Europe was the ideal. 
Further proof of the relationship between Kemalism, modernity, and Westernization is provided 
by Bozdoğan and Kasaba: “Turkish modernizers had readily identified modernization with 
Westernization – with taking a place in the civilization of Europe.”  They continue more explicitly that for 
Kemalists, “Modernity, in their conception, was a total project: one of embracing and internalizing all 
the culture dimensions that made Europe modern” (37).  The creation of a nation of Turks and the goal 
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of becoming European were the ideological grounds for the societal reforms that Atatürk would soon 
implement.   
Atatürk’s reforms were quite extensive and had momentous impacts on daily life in Turkey.  
Some examples of Kemalist changes were the switch to following European time, the new requirement 
of European dress, and even the change from Ottoman script to the Latin alphabet (Zürcher 144).  In 
response to some societal discontent concerning the requirement of wearing of hats as opposed to the 
traditional fez, Atatürk proclaimed: 
“it was necessary to abolish the fez, which sat on our heads as a sign of ignorance, of fanaticism, 
of hatred to progress and civilisation, and to adopt in its place the hat, the customary head- 
dress of the whole civilised world, thus showing, among other things, that no difference existed 
in the manner of thought between the Turkish nation and the whole family of civilised 
mankind.”  (Kemal 721-722) 
Atatürk wanted to make clear that a civilized, modern nation was not compatible with traditional 
Ottoman ways of life.  Reforms were necessary to set Turkey on the correct path to progress, putting it 
amongst “civilized mankind,” meaning Europe.   
And while Kemalism involved many reforms, the change that best illustrates Atatürk’s ambition 
of making Turkey more like Europe was his belief in strict secularism, which is certainly the greatest 
lasting ideological component of modern Kemalism.  This secularization movement began with the 
replacement of sharia rule with a Western civil code, essentially removing the basis of religious morals 
from the functioning of society (Zürcher 136).  Affirming his commitment to secular beliefs, Atatürk once 
stated an interview that “He is a weak ruler who needs religion to uphold his government…My people 
are going to learn the principles of democracy, the dictates of truth and the teachings of science” 
(Mango 463).  And though secularization might imply that the state would step back from having any 
part in religious components of society, Turkey’s initial secularization ideas actually led to the state 
having greater influence over religion (Zürcher 279).  By moving education and law to the command of 
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the state away from the Islamic influence that was previously responsible for those essential parts of 
society, Atatürk hoped to remove Islam’s grip from the Turkish republic. 
The debate between secularization and the role of Islam is a huge component of the modernity 
debate in current Turkish politics.  Emad Bazzi explores how Atatürk believed in the importance of 
secularization concerning not only separation from the state and Islamic institutions, “but the liberation 
of the individual mind from the traditional Islamic concepts and practices” (105).  Only the achievement 
of pure Kemalist secularization would merit Turkish modernity.  This idea is crucially relevant today as 
Turkey’s ruling power for over a decade, the AKP, rejects this notion of secularization. 
Bazzi presents an important explanation for understanding modernity, and his theory helps to 
explain why the AKP’s presence in Turkish politics is such a serious diversion from Kemalism.  In his 
understanding, modernity has two components; an intellectual discourse and a political project (104).  In 
Kemalism, the political project of modernity required an intellectual discourse that focused on 
secularism.  The AKP, however, has realized that Islam represents the majority of Turks and is, in fact, a 
serious element of their identity (106).  The AKP offers what Donmez calls a “Conservative Democracy,” 
and aims to reconcile “a democratic system of government with values and social practices derived from 
the Islamic intellectual heritage” (Bazzi 107).  In coordination with Bazzi’s theory of modernity, the AKP 
uses Islam as its intellectual discourse and modernity as its political project, though through the 
manifestation of democracy (107).    The concept of modernity equaling democracy is the great 
ideological underpinning of the AKP and its political power in Turkey. 
As was mentioned above, Kemalist visions of modernization go hand in hand with the project of 
Westernization, of becoming like Europe.  As Kemalism and the AKP’s current political project involving 
Islamic modernity compete for power in Turkey, it’s crucial to inspect the third player influencing 
Turkish domestic politics and what it means in the context of modernity.  It was during Turkey’s still 
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continuing project of modernization and following the ideals set forth in Kemalism, that a new beacon of 
modernity was created.  It seemed fate that after several decades of Turkey’s desire and   processes 
designed to become just like Europe, that Europe appeared to start a club that would be the epitome of 
Westernization for Turkey: the EU.   
When the present day EU was still in its early stages as the European Economic Community 
(EEC), Turkey promptly applied for membership.  The foundation of what is today’s EU had been around 
for less than a decade when Turkey requested membership in 1959.  Though Turkey was deemed 
unsuitable for membership at the time, it was offered different agreements that were focused on 
connecting the European and Turkish economies.  As the EU began to grow and accept more candidate 
states as members, Turkey decided to apply for full membership in 1987.  Once more it was determined 
that Turkey would not be admitted.   
When the EEC began, its focus was mostly based on integrating the member states’ economies.  
However, by the time that the EU finally accepted Turkey as a full membership candidate and 
negotiations were launched in 2005, membership in this association involved much more than economic 
interests.  The EU is a political project which has no comparison for its size, scope, or depth of 
connection.  It is a supranational body whose concerns now touch all manner of society.  The process of 
accession, the massive institutional and legal reform required in integration, is challenging and 
extensive.  And while Turkey has begun the process, its progress has been by all measures, slow.  Since 
2005, only one of the 35 negotiating chapters is provisionally closed and the majority of the remainder 
are officially “frozen” and therefore inactive (European Commission 2014).  
The irony of Turkey’s relationship with the EU is that the EU is itself essentially a modernization 
project.  And while Turkey has been engaged in its own efforts towards modernity, it has yet to be fully 
embraced by the EU.  The EU’s modernization project has proven to be a powerful force.  It is the 
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desired association for any European country hoping to reach the pinnacle of modernity.  In this light, it 
makes complete sense that Turkey would set its sights on this exclusive membership.  In examining 
different views on Europeanization, Alper Kaliber sees that “the EU found the opportunity to impose its 
conception of modernity and development through accession” (31).  Accession has proven incredibly 
effective in spreading the EU’s definition of modernity, defined by Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon as 
“legitimated around a collective identity based on liberal norms of capitalist democracy” (13).    
 Europeanization, as concerning the EU’s definition, changes the structure of a state’s modernity 
to a “more pluralistic, inclusive, and participatory paradigm,” which is in stark contrast to Kemalism’s 
top-down methodology (Kaliber 32).  Europeanization involves some level of top-down change, but its 
main goal is for societies to accept and embrace the new modernity that the EU offers.  This change 
begins when “the actors holding social and political capital learn and internalize European rules, norms 
and institutions so as to redefine their identities and interests” (Kaliber 34).  In this process the EU 
replaces the state in furthering the desired conception of modernity. 
The EU modernization project also offers something important to members through accession.  
The process of implementing the required reforms and generating domestic change is a journey to 
becoming modernized.  Kaliber states that once “’European-Wide’ norms, rules, and procedures get 
diffused and the institutional and policy misfit between the domestic and EU level is eliminated,” the 
process of modernization is complete (36).  So when debating the EU’s notion of modernity, it is 
imperative to recognize that this modernization project offers an end to the quest of ‘true’ modernity.  
As a supranational organization, the EU is not a domestic political actor in this debate over modernity.  
The EU is a modernization project that can be adapted by any domestic political actor, and if accession is 
completed, modernity can be achieved.  At this point, the EU’s role is solidified and its position made 
permanent and institutionalized, making it a separate class of domestic actor.  Therefore the EU 
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operates in a different realm of political modernity than Kemalism and the AKP, even though all interact 
and compete within the Turkish domestic political context.  
  It is in this context of competing narratives that the current debate surrounding modernity in 
Turkey is raging.  It is torn between its historical backbone of Kemalism and its powerful new political 
path directed by the AKP.  Yet the EU and its unprecedented modernity project still pulls powerfully, 
representing what both sides desire and disdain at the same time.  Exploring the intersection of these 
three parties at work in Turkish domestic politics will help to illuminate the importance of modernity in 
Turkish politics and society, and better predict what “modern Turkey” may look like in the future. 
METHODOLOGY 
My methodological approach in performing this research question was an exploratory 
qualitative method.  My paper includes a brief history of Kemalism and the discussion of modernity in 
Turkey, with the main focus being the current political use of modernity by the current domestic actors; 
Kemalists and the AKP.  This is done through discourse analysis of Kemalist, AKP and EU documents and 
political statements.  I focus on recently introduced Turkish legislation and parliament activity to 
highlight the official changes in political focus.  I also analyze statements and conversations around 
recent highly publicized political scandals and events, as these happenings are deeply connected to the 
debate surrounding Turkey’s future and modernity question.   
 Books and academic articles form the foundation of my research sources, as the conversation of 
scholars and academics, most of them Turkish and a number of them public intellectuals, is essential in 
forming a clear and meaningful political thought groundwork.  E. Fuat Keyman, one of the foremost 
scholars on Turkish modernity and Leda-Agapi Glyptis provide several works discussing the intersection 
of modernity and politics in Turkey.  Yaprak Gürsoy also provides insight into Turkish civil-military 
relations in the context of EU reforms.  Turkish newspapers are also relevant in the context of 
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modernity, aiding in the understanding of different current events as well acting as a gauge of public 
reaction.  Hurriyet Daily News is currently the oldest English newspaper in Turkey with a secular and 
liberal viewpoint.  It has a respectable lineup of journalists providing thoughts on events in Turkey.  
Today’s Zaman is another respectable English newspaper in Turkey.  Today’s Zaman is generally 
associated as a more conservative paper with ties to followers of the Gülen Movement.  In following 
both Hurriyet Daily News and Today’s Zaman, these papers help to provide a wider base of news from 
two different opinions in Turkey.  Reporters without Borders World Press Freedom Index from 2014 and 
2015 provide current discussion on the situation of freedom of the press.  The Freedom House Freedom 
in the World 2014 and 2015 reports also provide an outside opinion of political and social freedom in 
Turkey.  EU documents provide a helpful, authoritative answer to the stance of the organization.  I use 
the European Commission Progress Reports from 2011-2014 to gauge EU opinion on Turkish domestic 
politics and Turkey’s harmonization progress.  The use of public opinion polls and surveys is also 
important to better illustrate more definite societal feelings in areas concerned with modernity.  I 
utilized a Pew Research Center Global Attitudes and Trends Survey, an Ankara-based MetroPOLL survey 
published in Today’s Zaman, along with a Gallup poll and a Eurobarometer survey.  Combining these 
different works and sources allows for a broad intake of information that can demonstrate long-term 
trends as well as the most current events and thoughts of the day, as Turkey’s modernity discussion is at 
a very critical stage.   
 The thesis is structured through a historical examination of Kemalism, focusing on its main 
components as well as its faults.  After tracing Kemalism’s relationship with the military, follows 
Kemalism’s moral legitimation issues, Kemalists adversaries, the struggle between Islam and secularism, 
and finishes with the examination the current situation of Kemalism in Turkish society and politics.  
Following Kemalism, an examination of the AKP begins with a focus on Islam as a societal shift, which is 
followed by the AKP’s origins and ideology, a brief introduction of Turkey and the EU.  This chapter also 
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includes the detailed relationship of the AKP and the EU including EU reforms as well as other initiatives 
put forth by the AKP.  The paper is concluded by examining the present situation of Turkish modernity, 
focusing on the AKP and the EU, with attention to societal feelings about Turkey’s recent 
transformation.   
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Chapter 1: Kemalist Modernity and its Faults 
DEVIATIONS OF KEMALIST PRINCIPLES 
As discussed previously, Kemalism is the collection of Atatürk’s political ideas and beliefs utilized 
in his modernizing reforms.  Kemalism was long a widely accepted and strongly held political belief; 
more recently, its major role in society has been questioned.  This backlash against Kemalism can be 
observed in the success of the AKP party, a party with political ideals vastly differing from Kemalism.  But 
the question of why Kemalism has been abandoned by some of the population, while the rest of the 
population maintains their religious-like belief in it can be understood with two different explanations.  
The first reason for the societal shift away from Kemalism involves the morphing of Atatürk’s original 
Kemalism, into the Kemalism promoted by the military today.  The second reasoning involves 
Kemalism’s moral compass, or lack of, as Turkey’s societal foundation.  Both of these explanations 
heavily involve the role of modernity in shaping the social thoughts and feelings towards Kemalism in 
politics, and I will consider each in turn.    
Atatürk’s Kemalism entailed strict separation of military leaders and politics.  He believed that 
for Turkey to be a modern nation, civilian supremacy must be strictly upheld (Lerner and Robinson 21).  
But as we know now, this foundational belief of Kemalism has not held true in practice throughout 
Turkey’s subsequent history; for almost four decades, the Turkish military and Turkish politics instead 
seemed to go hand in hand.  Though the military role was not always overtly active, its presence behind 
the scenes in the running of the Turkish state was institutionalized and societally recognized.  But what 
caused this shift from clear civilian rule with the military in a ‘background role’ in politics, to the military 
becoming front and center directing the political scene of the nation?  While the first military coup in 
Turkey occurred in May 1960, Lerner and Robinson analyzed the environment which led the Turkish 
military to abandon Atatürk’s wishes.   
17 
 
The first necessary understanding is that the military acted as a vehicle that led Atatürk to 
power and created Turkey as a new state.  Because of Atatürk’s position, though he made clear that 
civilian leadership was the priority, the military’s interests were always represented in government.  
Atatürk also knew that while Turkey was currently safe from external threats that would likely not be 
the case in the future.  Lerner and Robinson argue that Atatürk prioritized overall modernization over 
updating his military because he knew that the state must be strong enough to withstand external 
threat.  Atatürk himself stated that Turkey would be a “national and modern State founded on the latest 
results of science” (Kemal 723).  A contemporary military is not possible without concomitant science 
and industry which in turn depend on “a transformed political and social system which would permit the 
people of Turkey to realize more fully their human potential” (Lerner and Robinson 26).   
While Atatürk’s social revolution encompassed reform throughout all of Turkey, reforms within 
the military helped to reinforce those general reforms.  In the 1950’s Turkey’s military enacted a general 
education program for illiterate draftees (35).  This reform came after the time of Atatürk, but is still 
important in understanding the military’s shifting role in society.  As around 50 percent of military 
draftees at the time were from rural areas with no formal secular education, the education of these men 
who would return home to their villages after their service would provide a helpful push towards the 
societal acceptance of the importance of education (34).  More importantly, this secular brand of 
education not only furthered the Kemalist vision of the military recruits, but had the potential to 
increase demand for public secular education in the more traditional, rural areas that were reticent to 
follow the Kemalist education reforms (36). 
This military education mission may not have directly played a role in the decision to undertake 
a coup, but it is certainly likely to have played a role in furthering society’s acceptance of the military’s 
role in politics at that time.    Also, the fact that many regional governors had military backgrounds 
helped to establish the military’s role in positions of power (28).  While Atatürk kept a strict separation 
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of the military and politics, the belief was that one could not maintain a position in both roles at the 
same time.  This meant that someone willing to leave their position in the military could then work in 
government or politics.  The military was responsible for developing administrative talents useful to the 
civilian governments (28).  Atatürk himself was a military man along with his Presidential successor and 
friend Ismet Inonu.  The presence of military figures, though separate from their military identity, helped 
create the environment in which the Turkish military had the ability to transition roles.  
The transition in roles of the military occurred after the government had begun to ease into a 
more democratic method of ruling.  Though Atatürk wanted Turkey to be a democracy, his top-down 
approach and single party rule would not meet democratic requirements today.  It was not until 1946 
that Turkey had its first multi-party elections and it was in the second multiparty election in 1950 that 
Atatürk’s party, CHP, lost power (Gürsoy, “Changing Role” 741).  It was in the decade of rule by the rival 
Democrat Party that Turkey was undergoing social and economic turmoil, and the new governing party 
attempted to use the military in a new role.  This new party attempted to use the military for political 
support, subjected promotable military men to the pressures of politics, and attacked the societal 
“intellectual elite” which had long been a source for the junior officer corps (41).  As Lerner and 
Robinson point out, the current government “violat[ed] the basic Kemalist doctrine of an apolitical army 
– it subverted the principle of civilian supremacy” (42).  The military belief was that to return to civilian 
supremacy, the military needed to step in and ‘straighten out’ the political system in a return to 
Kemalist principles. 
Action on behalf of the military was encouraged by Ismet Inonu who told a group of retired 
military leaders “that it was up to them, and to the military, to protect the soundness of Turkish society 
and the ideals of Turkish progress and development” (43).  Inonu’s statement was reported in the press 
in April, 1960 and was not refuted.  The role of the Turkish military as caretakers of the modern Turkish 
state in the vision of Atatürk was cemented on the morning of May 27, 1960 when the military 
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announced it had taken control of the state.  This first coup was followed by interventions in 1971 and 
1980, with other military ‘corrections’ as recently as 1997 that cannot be considered outright coups.  But 
after each coup, “the military oversaw the drafting of a new constitutional and legal framework, 
increasing its own autonomy and political powers within the system” (741).  So though the military 
returned power to civilians after holding new elections each time, they institutionalized their role within 
the government to minimize the chances of future governments straying from the Kemalist doctrine 
they believed was necessary to make Turkey a modern nation.  
It was at this time that Kemalism transformed from purely Atatürk’s ideas and reforms into 
something different.  Kemalist fear necessitated the security of Turkey, and by interfering, the military 
and elites interpreted Kemalism as a static concept, neglecting its ability to evolve.  Kemalism now 
persisted purely as an idea; it could never deliver modernity or democracy, but would ensure Kemalist 
elites stayed in power.   
IMPLICATIONS OF KEMALISM AND TURKISH MODERNITY 
Though Turkey’s military has succeeded in imbedding itself in politics, and even maintained its 
mostly reverential position in society, their constant interference has not been without consequence.  
As can be witnessed by the current popularity of the AKP, a party that seems fundamentally at odds with 
Kemalism, not all of Turkish society is in full agreement with Kemalism and its ideology long-dominant in 
government.  And while most supporters of Kemalism appreciate the military guiding Turkey away from 
“dangerous” ideas and political objectives deemed a threat to state, there are groups within Turkey 
that, understandably, don’t agree with the removing of a democratically elected government.  This is an 
example of one of the critical contradictions of Kemalism.  
The notion that the military has a hand in the direction of the state and even intervenes in the 
name of “protecting” Turkey’s modernity, from a Western perspective, seems irreconcilable.  Yet in 
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understanding the status of current Kemalism, this is not only acceptable, it is imperative.  The military 
staging coups and intervening to replace democratically elected governments certainly would not pass 
the definition of Western standards of modernity.  Yet these acts occurred in Turkey between the years 
of 1960 and 1997 under the premise of protecting this very concept as put forth by Atatürk as a plan of 
Westernization.  This illustrates the complex notion of modernity and what it entails and means within 
Turkey, and how this Turkish concept of modernity differs from the West.   
THE EXPERIENCE OF MODERNIZATION AND MORAL LEGITIMATION 
Şerif Mardin, a well-known Turkish scholar whose vocal and controversial statements about 
Islam in Turkish politics, has a very useful take on Kemalism’s current situation.  Stating that Islam has 
claimed victory over the Republic, he raises an important point; “The republic has not given the question 
of what is good, right and aesthetic and deeper consideration.  That is the deficiency of Kemalism” (qtd. 
in Karaveli 89).  Mardin elaborates that while the West has had philosophers and theorists that 
developed foundational beliefs, “the republic has nothing of the kind, no philosophy of ethics, to 
display” (qtd. In Karaveli 89).  While the ideology of Kemalism has a clear and elaborate foundation of 
thought (essentially Atatürk’s words and actions in the early days of the Republic), he is correct in 
pointing out that Kemalism lacks a convincing ethical/moral rationale.  Why must Turkey be modern?  
Because it must join the advanced civilizations and escape from its backward traditionalism is the 
Kemalist answer.  But this explanation alone lacks deeper meaning.  Why must the state be free from 
the influence of Islam? Because that is how it is in the West, and that is what it takes to be modern isn’t 
a constructive answer.  But at its basic level, that is the Kemalist reasoning.  Turkey’s experience of 
modernity differs from the West’s in important ways that have frayed the persuasiveness of Kemalism in 
recent times.   
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Karaveli notes that in response to Mardin’s statements, others have pointed out that the 
Kemalists who have been in government since Atatürk’s time have failed to develop these essential 
“secular notions of good and right, of secular ethics” (Karaveli 90).  Instead, these military and party 
leaders have been insistent on Atatürk’s original vision and ideas.  To articulate anything deeper wasn’t 
seen as necessary, and an organic source of new secular ideas from within Turkey never occurred.  A 
possible symptom indicating Kemalism’s moral void is the fact that in the 1970s the government took 
philosophy out of the high school curriculum.  Also, during the military rule in the early 1980s, religion 
and ethics were combined as a single subject, implying that religion was an adequate source of morals 
and neglecting the need for deeper political thought (Karaveli 90).  Without being aware, Kemalists had 
acknowledged that Kemalism neglected to offer a convincing replacement for the Islam it removed. 
In general, the failure of the state to produce an appropriate set of meaningful ethics or guiding 
moral compass can be attributed to two explanations.  The first is the failure of the state after Atatürk’s 
death to conform to Kemalist teachings, or rather, the too strict of following of Kemalist teachings, 
denying the natural progression and growth Atatürk had anticipated.  Atatürk’s ideal modern individual 
was “Western in outlook and freed from superstition and religious orthodoxy” (Karaveli 90).  Creating 
this individual would take time, but the deviations in Kemalist applications failed to produce Kemalist 
individuals who sought to create the modernity that Atatürk dreamt of.  Instead, the state created 
individuals that followed Kemalism like it was its own religious doctrine, never seeking deeper validation 
that would spread its reception to those who struggled to accept it as a legitimate authority.  This ties 
into the second explanation behind Kemalism’s lack of moral compass, which is that Turkey lacked the 
same political background and history that led to modernization in the West.  Atatürk modeled his plan 
for modernity on the experience of the West, and this imitation of institutions but lack of shared past 
has led to different outcomes in Turkey. 
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For Atatürk, modernization and secularization went hand in hand.  While this may have been 
true in the West, the main problem was that modernization and secularization “was a “naturally” 
evolving process in the West,” and by all accounts, Kemalism in Turkey was not (Karaveli 91).  This 
Western “modernity” evolved over centuries, and can be attributed to the intolerance and violence in 
medieval Europe which subsequently legitimized “the notion that belief was a matter of opinion, 
fostering a culture of dissent, of tolerance or skepticism” (Karaveli 95).  Kemalism was a top-down 
process that didn’t take into consideration that modernization in the West (the ideological point of 
reference) was a “mechanism of social transformation,” and was unlikely to be broadly accepted by 
Turkish society (Bazzi 106).  Most importantly, the biggest issue that Kemalism neglected to understand 
was that;  
“Western secularization was driven by societal dynamics, the rise of capitalism and of its 
bourgeoisie, which had empowered individuals, and of the concomitant evolution of natural 
sciences that expressed an emancipation of the mind that undermined the church’s claim to the 
truth” (Karaveli 91). 
Kemalism removed religion from the state, but it did not remove the place of Islam as the guiding truth 
of the population.  
Not only was Turkey lacking the same context that led a more natural progression towards 
modernity and secularization, the state has always struggled to define an appropriate modern citizen-
state relationship.  Hürsoy discusses the pluralist concept that effective states and societies are involved 
in a “mutually transformative relationship;” while the state structure interacts with society, it does not 
determine societal relations.  He then recalls Özbuden who acknowledges that the Turkish model 
operates outside of the pluralist state model; “the state is valued in its own right, is relatively 
autonomous from society, and plays a tutelary and paternalistic role.  This paternalistic image is 
reflected in the popular expression devlet baba (father state)” (Hürsoy 51).  The lack of societal 
mobilization in the creation of the Turkish state has led to an unhealthy relationship between the 
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citizens and the state.  Instead of a mutual relationship where the citizens feel they have a voice in their 
government, the Republic treats its citizens as if they are children, always getting into trouble and not 
believing that they are mature enough to make their own decisions.  This is the type of thinking that 
justifies the removal of democratically elected governments and strict pressure on the media; 
maintaining close control over citizens seen as important security measures implemented with the 
Kemalist mindset that it is for their own good.  The 1920s Kemalist slogan “for the people, despite the 
people,” still underlies the Kemalist outlook and actions of the state today (Taspinar). 
Kemalism believed that Turkey could become a modern nation “through the introduction and 
the dissemination of Western reason and rationality into what was regarded as a traditional and 
backward social formation” (Keyman, “Modernization” 318).  But without a good reason to abandon the 
traditional society (where Islam was the center of politics and the community), Kemalism failed to 
provide an appealing call to the conservative religious populations that had nothing to gain by 
embracing Atatürk’s secular reforms.  In theory, Kemalism would create a better, stronger, and most 
importantly, modern society that would lead to the improvement of Turkey’s situation (as had occurred 
in the West with modernization).  But this state-disseminated ideology lacked compelling meaning to 
different components of society: all minorities, but most importantly Kurds, along with deeply religious 
individuals who felt that religion should be an essential part of the state.    
Atatürk’s mission was to replace the role of Islam with nationalism, as he witnessed in the West.  
However, “In Europe, nationalism arose to fill the void left by religion, where the void was already 
created by the Enlightenment” (Gülap 356).  Turkey did not have such a void, and at the end of the 
Ottoman order, “the public and political role of religion had not declined…and hence nationalism could 
only be imposed by directly trying to displace religion” (Gülap 356).  Though Atatürk was successful in 
drawing many together in the birth of the Turkish Republic under nationalism, Kemalism as a whole 
neglected to offer many people something as substantial as the Ottoman order did; “it was religion that 
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supplied that ultimate meaning of politics; what legitimated power was the perception that it upheld a 
religiously defined order” (Karaveli 92).  The experience of the fall of the Ottoman Empire was not at all 
similar to the changes that occurred in the West, it had not been “shattered by capitalism, science, or 
ideological relativism, which centuries of intra-religious strife has fostered in the West, undermining 
Christianity from within” (Karaveli 92).  This lack of a natural movement away from Islam as the 
organizing component of government meant that top-down secularism was doomed to struggle for full 
legitimation.  And this is exactly what has occurred in Turkey.   
The Kemalist modernization plan also has another serious fault in its implementation; rather 
than “a self-generating societal process… modernizers wield state power and are agents of their own 
interests.  For this reason, even if they profess a project of Westernization, they are not necessarily 
committed to all dimensions of modernity” (Bozdoğan and Kasaba 39).  Atatürk was committed to 
setting the stage so that over time, Turkey would have caught up to the West and then be on the same 
level, becoming an equal, making similar political and economic decisions that matched their 
achievement in modernity, though he recognized that there would be initial flaws.  However, the 
Kemalist elite in the decades since Atatürk’s death have not been fully committed to ‘all dimensions of 
modernity;’ they are committed to keeping Turkey safe and protecting Atatürk’s ideas.  What Atatürk’s 
modernity looks like would, I believe, be democracy and capitalist markets like the West.   
But Turkey does not have a complete Western-style democracy, and it is in part because 
Kemalists have felt that their citizens must be controlled and directed.  Turkey has a modernity debate 
because Kemalism has failed to achieve this ideal.  Its top-down approach has failed to convert reluctant 
citizens who felt Kemalism betrayed their political principles.  The military and state elites chose to 
interpret Kemalism as a static ideal.  Modernity is the ever important goal, a place where Turkey is 
heading as long as the country sticks to Atatürk’s blueprint.  But because of a rigid interpretation of this 
plan, modernization has never developed as organically as expected.   
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Kemalism has nonetheless been incredibly successful as an ideology.  Its popularity and fervor 
among many in the population cannot be denied.  But this does not negate the fact that Kemalism has 
been incredibly problematic for many Turks, which has led to many to question its effectiveness and role 
in society.  There are numerous difficulties and faults with Kemalism (as with any ideological system), 
but the most obvious and troublesome is its relationship with Islam and secularism.  The place of Islam 
in Turkey is the most significant contemporary issue in the debates between Kemalists, the AKP, and the 
EU for what modernity really means.   
KEMALIST ADVERSARIES 
Atatürk did not come to power without opposition, and his radical transformation of Turkey set 
the stage for the political and societal difficulties that still plague the nation.  Atatürk’s design had clear 
ambitions that were to guide Turkey to the pinnacle of modernity; 
“[Atatürk] had envisioned for Turkey an organized, well-articulated, linear process of 
modernization through which the whole nation was going to move simultaneously and with 
uniform experience.  At the end of this process, there would emerge a militantly secular, 
ethnically homogenous republic well on its way to catching up with the civilized nations of the 
West” (Bozdoğan and Kasaba 17).     
What Turkey looks like nine decades later has certainly failed to live up to this expectation of Kemalist 
unity.  Rather, the divide between “Muslim and secularist, Turk and Kurd, reason and faith, rural and 
urban – in short, the old and the new” is very much alive with the distinctions dividing society now even 
stronger (Bozdoğan and Kasaba 17).  Kemalism did not unite Turkey as planned; rather, it created deep 
fissures, particularly surrounding Kurds and Islamists that have only widened with time.   
As the guardians of this original Kemalist vision, the Turkish military has played an integral role 
in trying to keep the belief of Kemalist modernity alive while fending off all perceived threats to its 
continuation.  And according to the Kemalists, the threats are plentiful; the “state elite, including the 
intellectual-bureaucratic elite and military, distrusts all forms of activity, whether they be primarily 
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ethnic or religious, and perceives them as a threat to the centralized unitary ideology of the Turkish 
state” (Hürsoy 52).  The ethnic and religious activity referred to is mostly directed at Kurds and radical 
Islamists.  However, the definition of what constitutes “radical Islam” is broad, and in the minds of 
Kemalists could be anyone who simply tries to marry Islam and politics, regardless of whether or not 
their ideology would actually be considered radical in a broader sense.   
While these fears are real, whether or not such perceived threats can truly harm the nation isn’t 
questioned; the answer is always yes.  The fundamentalist thinking of Kemalism requires that the state 
be secular and it’s a fact that the nation is made of Turks.  Atatürk sought to negate the Ottoman past 
which “had relied on multi-ethnicity and multi-religiosity” which he saw as playing into its downfall 
(Demir 385).  This mistake would not be repeated.  The Kemalist elite act on Atatürk’s words:  
 “Our thinking and our mentality will have to become civilized.  And we will be proud of this 
civilization.  Take a look at the entire Turkish and Islamic world.  Because they failed to adapt to 
the conditions and rise, they found themselves in such a catastrophe and suffering.  We cannot 
afford to hesitate any more.  We have to move forward… Civilization is such a fire that it burns 
and destroys those who ignore it” (qtd. in Bozdoğan and Kasaba 27, 28) 
Atatürk’s speeches offered grave, urgent declarations, and these are still the words that Kemalists live 
by.  Civilization, i.e. modernity, must be achieved or Turkey will suffer the same fate of the Ottomans 
and other “backward” societies.  Maintaining Kemalist purity is the only way to protect Turkish 
modernity and Islamist and Kurdish separatist activities violate this Kemalist essentialism, and are rightly 
feared in the minds of the Kemalist elite.   
The Turkish nation was defined by Atatürk as a territorial identity, those within the boundaries 
of the state are a part of the Turkish nation, and are therefore Turks (Gülap 356).  Acknowledging the 
rights of Kurds would be a recognition that the Kurds are a separate group apart from Turks (as defined 
by Atatürk, a Turk is a Turk, and he purposefully neglected to acknowledge the Kurds status as anything 
other than “Turk”).  The Kurdish Problem that is commonly externally discussed concerning Turkey still 
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remains an issue, but only from the outside, as “Kemalists deny the existence of a “Kurdish Problem” 
and speak mostly in euphemisms such as “terrorism” and “underdevelopment”” (Bozdoğan and Kasaba 
17).  There is the belief that external forces look to tear apart Turkey, and the Kurds are a pawn in this 
game.  Despite the fact that in the 1980s Kurds strongly “reclaimed and reasserted their distinct cultural 
and ethnic identity and use it as a basis for organizing an armed struggle against the Turkish army,” 
Kemalists refuse to acknowledge that Kurds deserve any type of minority rights (Bozdoğan and Kasaba 
16).  Doing so would go against the Kemalist ideology and would threaten the unity and stability of the 
state.  And while the struggle of the Kurds has received attention by the EU and other international 
groups interested in human rights, within Turkey the result of this conflict with the Kurdish insurgent 
group, the PKK, has generally only increased hostility towards Kurds. 
The fear of the partitioning of Turkey by the Kurds is only surpassed by the alarm of radical Islam 
pulling Turkey back to the Ottoman days of traditionalism and backwardness.  Despite Kemalists’ efforts, 
there is still a sizeable portion of the population that wishes to see Islam play a part in government and 
politics.  This has led to a partitioning of society among three major fault lines: “The Kemalist, Islamist, 
and Kurdish nationalist ideologies share a strong intolerance for one another” (Bozdoğan and Kasaba 
18).  The common enemy for Islamist and Kurdish groups is the Turkish state, but these groups share no 
other commonalities.  Because of the strength of each ideology and focus on what they believe is the 
right, modern path, with “each position hold[ing] the key to absolute and complete truth,” they are 
demonstrative of Turkish politics as a whole (Bozdoğan and Kasaba 18).  These divergent fundamentalist 
beliefs have led to an impenetrable polarization of Turkish politics that has been present since the 
founding of the Republic.   
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KEMALISM AND QUESTIONS OF RELIGION AND SECULARISM 
Because the intersection of Islam, secularism, and the state is such a contentious issue in 
Turkey, it is essential to understand the connection between Islam and the state, and how this 
relationship was created by Kemalism.  It is also important to appreciate the differences between 
religion and the state in Turkey under Kemalist secularism and in the West, which Atatürk sought to 
emulate.  The most important belief in Kemalism is the acceptance of secularism as a necessary 
component of modernity.  Kemalist ideology champions strict secularism, painting the picture that a 
state involving religion simply cannot be modern, as it goes against a defining pillar of Kemalism.  Yet 
from the beginning of the Republic, Islam has been a component of government.  This relationship 
seems out of place, given the centrality of secularism in Kemalist doctrine and the fact that since the 
founding of the Republic, Kemalism has been the enemy of Islam.  But Atatürk understood that Islam 
could not simply disappear overnight, and he realized that he would have to work around Islam in some 
matters, but also work with it in others.  Kemalism’s secularization plan was to first “relegate religion 
into the private realm” (Gülap 356).   
What Atatürk wanted his Turkish Republic model of secularism to look like was based on the 
French model of laïcité.  Kemalism continued on with the strict ideology that religion and state must be 
separate in Turkey, with the common belief that there is indeed pure secularism in Turkey.  However, in 
reality, from the very beginning the Turkish Republic has maintained a relationship with Islam.  Though 
the first step was to move religion from public to private spheres, it most importantly acted with the 
belief that “Islam was not to be reformed, it was to be controlled” (Karaveli 100).  With the very 
founding of the Republic, Atatürk created state institutions for regulating religious matters.  The 
Presidency of Religious Affairs was seen as a necessity and was created mostly to guard against “the 
misuse of religious affairs” (Akyüz 65).  
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By placing control of religious services in a state institution, the state could monitor all Islamic 
activity that could threaten to undermine the state.  Under this office after the founding of the Republic;  
“the finances of religious foundations were brought under state control; religion schools…were 
closed, and in their place Imam-Hatip schools were created to train preachers and other 
religious personnel in accordance with the priorities of the nationalist regime” (Gülap 357).   
Dervish lodges and all religious orders and brotherhoods were believed to be the “sources for 
reactionary movements,” and were subsequently closed and outlawed (Akyüz 68, Gülap).  The existence 
of these religious organizations were of course considered backward in Atatürk’s mind, and their 
continued presence would have created an environment that undermined his reforms.  Understanding 
that Islam was still a fact of life for the vast majority of the population, there was need for the state to 
monitor and control religious activities.   
The department was believed necessary to deter activities that “might be against the values of 
the Republic,” and in fact, the current Turkish state (since the 1980s) utilizes this office to employ Islam 
to meet “the moral needs of the nation” (Akyüz 68, Keyman, “Remaking” 39).  Specifically, the 1982 
Turkish Constitution Article 136 states that the Presidency of Religion Affairs shall act “in accordance 
with the principles of secularism, removed from all political views and ideas, and aiming at national 
solidarity and integrity.”  Also through this department, the state decides what areas of life are 
“national,” and what areas are religious.  The state is closely involved in determining where these 
“separations” exist in the complicated realm of where “legal-constitutional, official ceremonial, and 
parliamentary practice” intersect through “executive and judicial enforcement and control by the state” 
(Keyman, “Remaking” 39).  The existence of this department deeply involved in regulating religion 
within a secular state is a basic contradiction, and the presence of this governmental department in a 
secular state has resulted in some obvious gray areas, especially in politics.  Political association around 
religion is strictly regulated and is an example of the oddly defined “separations” between religion and 
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politics, demonstrating the “power relationship constituted by purposes of control and oversight” 
(Keyman, “Remaking” 39).   
The idea of the state being in a role of control and oversight over religion is a description of 
secularism that clearly strays from the French version of Laicism that Atatürk sought to copy, and is even 
much different than how secularism is conceived in the West in general.  Glyptis sees that Atatürk’s 
model of Turkish laiklik is actually “a system that is neither fully ‘secular’ nor ‘laic’” (“Kemalism” 170).  
Rather, a more honest interpretation of what Kemalists call secularism is “a form of “political Islam” – 
state sanctioned religion and morality for the nation, not “no religion;” integrated, related, and co-
functioning political and religious spheres, not “fully autonomous spheres of governance” (Keyman, 
“Remaking” 40).  While the end goal may have allowed for Turkey to relinquish its control over religion, 
Atatürk recognized that this step would not be possible until the second step of his secularization 
process was completed.   
The importance of nationalism in Turkey is well understood, and Atatürk wanted it this way, as 
the second part of his secularization plan was to ultimately replace Islam with nationalism.  Moving 
religion to the private sphere, the nation was meant to take its place in the public sphere, becoming the 
most important concern to citizens.  As long as the state acted to meet the needs of the nation, and the 
nation was the most important thing, the removal of Islam from the political sphere would not be 
missed.  Atatürk’s hope was that the importance of the nation would replace the importance of the 
religious community.  Though Kemalism’s emphasis on the nation took hold in the beginning, and as 
anyone familiar with Turkish nationalism can attest, it is still very much alive today, nationalism 
nonetheless failed to sufficiently replace Islam in its role as unifier of Turkish society.   
The outcome of Kemalism’s struggle to achieve a secular government and remove Islam’s 
strength in society has been a many decades long battle for legitimacy.  For Kemalists, trying to keep 
31 
 
Islamists out of politics is a job that seemingly never ends.  This is because bringing Islam into politics 
seems a natural step to many, and Kemalists have been quick to seek out and dismember parties that 
they believe are unconstitutional by their association with Islam.  The interesting relationship between 
the state and Islam has actually become more complicated since the 1980s during the military rule after 
a coup.  This relationship has only tightened the connection between the Turkish state and Islam, and 
more importantly, opened the door to Islamic politics that has had lasting repercussions. 
ISLAM AND POLITICS AND THE LIBERAL CONNECTION 
When the military staged their third coup in 1980, a key goal was to change Turkish politics to 
prevent the need for another episode of military intervention.  Kemalists and the military had been 
unable to restore stability during the past decade and therefore needed to make bold moves to create 
the social and political stability they wanted to support the economic stability reforms they needed.  The 
group of top military commanders that ruled for three years was the National Security Council (NSC).  
The first step of the NSC was to outlaw political action, an attempt to depoliticize society, which was 
followed by taking control of the education system, in hopes of socializing the new generations within 
this new agenda (essentially an altered Kemalism) (Glyptis, “Kemalism”; Birtek and Toprak).  These steps 
were combined with one more daring move by Kemalists, which they determined to be the cure for 
society’s ills (though, would eventually be recognized as a huge mistake on the part of Kemalists).  This 
bold move enacted by the NSC in the 1980’s was the first open marriage of Kemalism and Islam.  In their 
“attempt to forge social cohesion and wholesome values (respect for authority and family-orientation),” 
the NSC openly promoted the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis as the new state ideology.  This did not replace 
Kemalism, rather it adapted Kemalism to the state’s immediate needs, expanding Turkish national 
identity to include Islam (Blad and Koçer 47).  This new state plan incorporated Islam to foster a “sense 
of moral community” through the pairing of nationalism and shared morality (Birtek and Toprak 196).   
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The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was to foster social stability, which would be the basis for the NSC 
to radically restructure the economy “in accordance with neoliberal ideology” (Blad and Koçer 44).  The 
plan was to connect “the individual with the state, and… serve as a unifying force between different 
classes and strata” which would help control “unnecessary conflicts that rapid marketization of the 
traditional economic relations might engender” (Birtek and Toprak 196).  The state was transitioning 
towards market-oriented reforms in response to conditionality terms by the IMF and World Bank to 
receive loans Turkey desperately needed (Atasoy 76).  To protect society from the backlash potential of 
new economic reform policies, the NSC focused on incorporating Islam into the cultural foundation of 
the state.  This related more specifically to the economic realm as it was used in the “Islamization of 
Turkish labor through the state advocacy of cultural, rather than the traditional class-based, trade union 
organizations” as well as “the reduction of state-managed social service provision and the privatization 
of these services under Islamist patronage” (Blad and Koçer 45). 
While privatizing social services and education helps to reduce public spending in line with 
neoliberal ideology, it also “had the supplementary effect of shifting legitimacy from secular to cultural 
institutions” (Blad and Koçer 47).  The economic reforms combined with large-scale urbanization at the 
time “exacerbated income inequality, and a need for social services that only Islamic institutions seemed 
to be providing” (Blad and Koçer 47).  This spread of Islamic welfare groups providing relief, as opposed 
to the state in the new time of hardship is cited by multiple authors as a cause for the ““Islamization” of 
impoverished urban communities” (Blad and Koçer 47, 48).   
Like the Kemalist version of secularism, this injection of Islam was used as means for social 
control.  This was poorly calculated, though; “They used religion, thinking they could contain it, in an 
attempt to forge a more socially homogenous and less politically active community” (Glyptis, 
“Kemalism” 176).  And in effect, with the neoliberalization of the state, Kemalists legitimized Islamic 
politics (Blad and Koçer 48).  This was an unintended effect, as it seems that military failed to fully 
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formulate the consequences of their actions.  Birtek and Toprak believed that the military viewed “the 
practice of Islam a passing phase relevant only until Turkey completed its transition to modernity, and 
until the functional alternative of religion would take root” (197).  This is the same line of thought 
followed by Atatürk, and while the promotion of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis seems a far cry from the 
necessary secularism, if the military believed that these neoliberal reforms would help Turkey finally 
achieve modernity, and that modernity would finally phase Islam from society, then this new ideology is 
easier to understand.  Nonetheless, these changes have left a serious, lasting impact; “Islam has found a 
new role as a social movement with substantial political leverage” making Islam a mainstream, political 
part of Turkish society (Birtek and Toprak 194). 
This new state plan embedding Islam as a component of Turkish society was intended to compel 
social integration and ease economic reforms, but also “to undercut the political agenda embedded in 
the reconstructive vision of the Left” (Birtek and Toprak 207).  As part of the depoliticization of society, it 
was not just Islamists the Kemalists were hoping to appease.  As Atasoy points out, along with closing 
political parties, trade unions, and civil-society associations the military arrested thousands of people, 
over half of which were leftists (84, 85).  This “regime of fear” established in the 1980s coup “created a 
political environment of widespread state coercion and violation of many fundamental rights and 
freedoms” (Atasoy 80).   
This sharp turn in Turkish society towards authoritarianism in the name of Kemalism only 
strengthened the Left’s belief that there must be another political option in Turkey.  In understanding 
the direction of the Left, Karaveli points out the differences between the typical Leftist ideologies in the 
West and those in Turkey; “In the West, liberalism has historically been anti-clerical and represented the 
rejection of the notion that inherited loyalties, religion, or tradition have any binding authority.  Turkish 
liberalism has a different history, one of alliance with pro-religious conservatism” (95, 96).  And as a 
result of the actions of the state, “Repelled by the authoritarianism of Kemalists, the otherwise secular, 
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modernist liberals are apt to look for deliverance by Islam, attributing an emancipating potential to 
religiosity by default” (Karaveli 96).   
THE CURRENT POSITION OF KEMALISM 
The 1980s coup effectively united Kemalism with state sanctioned Islam, leading to increased 
acceptance of the idea that Islam was a natural, important part of Turkish culture.  Economic reforms 
led to a restructuring of social services that also focused on Islam, particularly in education and charity 
organizations.  The Left, dismayed by the strict authoritarianism showcased by the Kemalist elite joined 
forces with Islamist politics in promoting a new, more open political path.  The connection between the 
Left and Islam has left deep marks on Kemalism; 
 “While legitimizing Islamic conservatism, the liberals have concomitantly delegitimized 
Kemalism… Liberal think tanks and privately funded universities have contributed to creating 
and sustaining a new, anti-Kemalist paradigm” (Karaveli 86) 
Karaveli sees that both Kemalism and liberalism are both “in collusion with religious conservatism” (89) 
He enumerates that “Turkish liberalism is explicit in its reverence for Islam, while Kemalism has implicitly 
acknowledged its dependence on religion” (89).  With liberals and Kemalists harboring implicit support 
for Islam, it seems only natural that Islamic parties would continue to be elected, even after, and maybe 
even especially, since the 1980s reforms by the military.    
The constitution put forth by the NSC in 1982 made Kemalism the official state doctrine, making 
any straying from that belief unconstitutional.  The constitution also “makes it clear that containing 
religious influences and safeguarding secularism is an ongoing task” (Glyptis, “Kemalism” 174).  For 
example, the Preamble of this Constitution (still Turkey’s current) states that “sacred religious feelings 
shall absolutely not be involved in state affairs and politics as required by the principle of secularism.”  
References to the secular nation of the state and its need to be protected is mentioned throughout the 
document.  And though the reforms of the 1980s were intended to end the need for military 
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involvement by their attempt to bridge the gap between the state’s secularism and the population’s 
religion; the election of an openly Islamist party, the Welfare Party in the mid-1990s created the need to 
reset the state back to Kemalism.  Necmettin Erbakan, the Prime Minister elected by the Welfare Party’s 
minority government in 1996, was a controversial and erratic leader (Glyptis, “Kemalism”).  His open 
Islamism and Euroskepticism gave rise to the widespread belief that “the democratic process had to be 
suspended to save secularism” (Atasoy 179).  So it was in February 1997 that the Turkish military, 
fighting “the dark forces of reactionaryism,” staged a ‘postmodern coup’ providing the government 18 
recommendations to protect the secular character of the Republic (Atasoy 88).  This act by the military, 
with the endorsement by bureaucrats and politicians, led to the resignation of the government in July of 
that year with the subsequent banning of the Welfare Party from politics (Atasoy; Glyptis, “Kemalism”).   
Some Kemalist supporters see this time as a sort of a rebirth of the “true” Kemalism that the 
military was supposed to stand for after the flaws of the 1980s Turkish-Islamic Synthesis.  But the 
damage to Kemalist legitimacy within Turkish society had been done, and the role of the 1980s coup 
only “created a legitimating precedent for Islamists, while also enabling them to attempt a  redefinition 
of secularism and its relationship with modernity without rejecting Kemalism” (Glyptis, “Kemalism” 
177).  The overall neoliberal changes to the state have led to the promotion of religious institutions 
providing services that work to “circumvent state-centered power relationships” that has worked “to 
create a cultural constituency fully supportive” of the Welfare Party, and the current ruling party, the 
AKP (Blad and Koçer 49).  The AKP lacked the same open Islamist leanings as the Welfare Party, but is 
still realistically considered what Blad and Koçer call “implied Islamist.”   
The ideology and Islamic leanings of the AKP will be explored more fully in the following chapter, 
but its presence as the ruling party in Turkey since 2002 proves that Islamic orientated parties (whether 
implied or overt) over the past few decades have proven themselves to be a force to be reckoned with.  
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And though their presence seems foreign to Kemalism, it raises the question of whether this was always 
destined to be an inevitability of Kemalist modernity; 
“The Kemalist heritage was committed to the Western sociopolitical system, but if that system 
was implemented, then sooner or later people who flirted with religion and betrayed the 
Kemalist tradition would win the elections.  Either you give up democracy and in doing so 
contradict the principles you are supposed to be applying or else you implement it, in which 
case you allow people to win who will, in turn, betray it” (Bozdoğan and Kasaba 243).   
This is the perfect summation of how Kemalism has played out in the past, and is currently functioning 
in Turkish politics. The result of this Kemalist dilemma is that it created a political system founded on 
democratic elections allowed by the military, which leads to a party being elected that fails to stick to 
the Kemalists standards, which leads to the military staging a coup to rid the government of the Kemalist 
challengers (Bozdoğan and Kasaba 243).  Then the process repeats. The progression towards achieving 
modernity, which would include democracy, raises the important question; will true democracy in 
Turkey result in an Islamist ruling party?  While there is no looking into the future, it is true that the past 
and present situation in Turkey has proven this to be true.  
This comprehensive overview of Kemalism and its changes throughout time have revealed deep 
contradictions.  These contradictions are important because, as Karaveli notes, it leaves many in Turkish 
society “ready to embrace any force that would present itself as the democratic alternative to a 
Kemalism that had come to be employed as an instrument for legitimizing oppression” (87).  And in 
fulfilling the democracy that citizens want, and Kemalist modernity calls for, moderate Islam has been 
cast as this new democratic alternative (Karaveli 87).  This has created a dilemma in Turkey about the 
future of the country and its very definition of modernity; “Having retained, until recently, a monopoly 
over the definition of modernity, Kemalists do not perceive Islamism as an alternative perception of 
modernity but as opposition to it” (Glyptis, “Kemalism” 179).  There is no question that current Kemalist 
thought is incompatible with Islam. 
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The question of what it means to be a modern state that includes Islam in any way, has 
intensified the polarization of Turkish politics to society.  Glyptis discusses how Turkish politics has been 
seemingly divided into two camps; the secularist and the Islamist; though she doesn’t think things are so 
simple.  Both sides are “heavily fragmented and diverse,” though “both sides use, to varying degrees, 
Kemalist legitimation narratives in the public arena” (“Kemalism” 178).  What this means is that “the 
state can now be used to serve both secular and Islamist aims, often simultaneously.  This creates 
potential for confusion and conflict, but more importantly, it creates space for the pursuit of many 
conflicting agendas concurrently” (Glyptis, “Kemalism” 178).  The current state of Turkish politics can be 
classified as containing much confusion and conflict, certainly with conflicting agendas as well.  
Kemalists and the AKP have made the question of what it means to be modern a classic matter of 
debate.  I will next examine the rise and rule of the AKP and its influence on the Turkish political 
conversation through an alternative use of modernity, while also exploring the role of the EU in the 
Turkish domestic political scene.  
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Chapter 2: AKP Modernity and the European Union 
AKP AND ISLAM AS A SOCIETAL SHIFT 
While the discussion of Kemalism is essential to understanding the political environment in 
which Turkey has operated for several decades, the exploration of the AKP is equally important.  As the 
current ruling party in Turkey it is of great interest; however, the AKP currently plays a role in the 
conversation of Turkish modernity that goes much deeper than its position as the main party in 
government.  The AKP has helped to redefine modernity in Turkey.  Its particular idea of modernity does 
not replace Kemalism; rather it is offered an alternative conception of modernity that is powerful and 
persuasive, and has helped to mobilize a large section of society that finds this new modernity 
meritorious.  And while the AKP has only been in power since 2002, its presence has made serious and 
lasting changes on the Turkish domestic political landscape, and most importantly, on the concept of 
how modernity is perceived in Turkey.   
As traced in the previous chapter, the Turkish political and social situation from the 1980s on 
faced many changes that led to a greater emphasis on Islamic organizations.  The presence and greater 
visibility of Islamic organizations combined with a rise in the prominence of conservative Muslim 
businessmen, created a social environment that was much more open to political Islam than in the past.  
This is not to say that a new population hoping for Islam in politics was suddenly awakened at this time, 
but that conditions created by the infusion of Islam into society as a moral compass by the government 
combined with changes stemming from the actual neoliberal economic reforms created a society that 
had a greater focus on Islam, and a population that was ready to infuse these thoughts into government.   
It is important to at least note the role of the Gülen Movement (Hizmet in Turkish) and its 
influence on society and the AKP.  Though the two groups come from different backgrounds with 
dissimilar aims, there was an implicit relationship between the Gülen Movement and the AKP during its 
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early days.  The Gülen movement, named for its founder, Islamic scholar and preacher Fethullah Gülen, 
claims to operate strictly as an Islamic social movement, and does not believe in politicizing Islam.  Its 
role as a social movement, however, has certainly impacted how pious Muslim individuals vote, which 
can be seen in the popularity of the AKP and its connection of support.  Also, its societal presence and 
networks has led its relationship (and subsequent very public and heated dispute or rift currently 
underway) with the AKP to be viewed in a more political light, and its very existence and nature of 
operation has made it intrinsically political.   
Overall the Gülen movement has helped to question the Kemalist understanding of modernity.  
Gülen promotes “Turkish Islam,” which he sees as compatible with democracy and modernity.  But this 
promotion of Islam and modernity points out the flaws promoted in the Western (Kemalist) brand of 
modernity; “Many mechanisms of self-control and autonomy, especially those arising from people’s 
cultural heritage and religion have been pushed out by modernity” (“What Makes”).  The Gülen 
movement offers an alternative to the Kemalist/Western conception of modernity, recognizing “the 
need for a new and inclusive synthesis arising from the past but based upon universal values and 
modern realities” (“What Makes”).  Though claiming to not want to politicize Islam in any way, he still 
believes Islam to be a complement to politics. Where that line is drawn is questionable, but it essentially 
looks to fill the role of morality in Turkish politics, while not explicitly being political.  But the 
relationship with the AKP seems to defy that belief, which is likely due to Gülen believing that Kemalists 
“did not allocate Islam a place in Turkish Modernization” (Keyman, “Remaking” 157).  The extreme 
secularism of Kemalists is off-putting for many Muslims, either very or moderately conservative, 
enhancing the appeal of the AKP.  Gülen supports Turkey’s mission to join the EU and his apolitical 
message has had an impact in how its followers reason about Turkish politics; “the Gülen movement can 
be considered to provide hints for the viability of multiple paths of modernity in the Turkish context” 
(Keyman, “Remaking” 167). 
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While not explicitly competing for power domestically, the Gülen movement is characteristic of 
the current upsetting of the status quo in the conversation around Turkish modernity.  His movement 
has helped to elevate the role of Islam in society, believing it to be an essential and important part of 
Turkish modernity, which has in turn elevated Islam’s role in politics along with promoting the belief 
that conservative Muslims have a voice.  Given the international attention the Gülen movement 
receives, combined with a sizeable population of adherents numbering in the millions and totaling an 
estimated 10 percent of the population, it is believed to be the “largest and strongest Islamic 
community in Turkey,” and in the past has supported the AKP in all previous elections (Oberti, 
Akyeşilmen and Özcan 35).  Currently however, its support for the AKP has been revoked due to what 
the movement’s leader has called a “witch-hunt” for its people.  Gülen himself claims that “Turkey has 
now reached a point where democracy and human rights have almost been shelved” (NYT).   
This break from previous support is indicative of the AKP’s path it has followed since winning its 
first major national election in 2002.  A decade ago, and even five years ago, opinions about the AKP 
were much different than they are today.  Today the debate about the AKP is vastly different than after 
its first election, though as with Kemalism, it depends on whose opinions you ask whether the direction 
is right or wrong.  The AKP’s continued neoliberal capitalist and EU reforms coupled with sociopolitical 
changes have led to a Turkey that is currently turbulent, with many worrying about the direction of 
modernity in their country.  However, there is no denying the party’s continued popularity despite its 
controversy.  As with Kemalism, it is necessary to follow the AKP’s path from inception to the present 
day to uncover its impact on the conversation of modernity through domestic politics. 
AKP EARLY JOURNEY AND IDEOLOGY 
The AKP won its first national election in 2002, an incredibly quick success for a party only 
established the year before.  The background of the AKP may be short, but its leaders have deeper and 
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successful roots.  The AKP’s origins can be traced to the Welfare Party, the political party ousted by the 
‘postmodern coup’ by the military in 1997 and subsequently constitutionally banned.  These same 
leaders then formed the Virtue Party, a party which met the same fate of violating secularist principles 
as the previous party (Gurses 647).  After the closure of the second party, the group split and formed 
two separate parties, the Felicity Party, another strongly Islamist party, and the reformist Justice and 
Development Party, referred to in this study as AKP. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the current President (from 
2014) and former Prime Minister of Turkey (from 2003-2014), was a founding member of the AKP and 
was elected as its first leader (Heper and Toktaş).  Erdoğan’s political background includes being mayor 
of Istanbul as a member of the Welfare Party; he was seen as a charismatic politician who believed in 
democratic principles and wasn’t afraid to express his Islamic piety (Heper and Toktaş). 
Erdoğan and the other founders of the AKP recognized the secularist foundation they were up 
against, and understood that to be successful and keep the party open they would need to scale back 
their identity as an Islamist party.  This change in identity manifested itself in almost a wholescale 
change of what a typical Islamist party in Turkey looks like.  It is clear that the AKP leadership recognized 
“a key lesson learned from the 28 February process [1997 postmodern coup] was to avoid hardened 
ideological positions” (Patton 343).  The party completely adapted itself to a new image, rejecting the 
Islamist title, but still acknowledging the members’ roots as conservative Muslims.  The AKP defined 
itself as a “center-right party with a conservative-democrat identity” (Keyman, “Modernization” 315).   
The AKP’s downplaying of the party’s Islamic roots served three important practical purposes; 
“First, it shielded the party from the likelihood of imminent closure; second, it safeguarded an Islamic 
lifestyle under the rubric of democratic freedoms; and third, it broadened the party’s appeal to liberal-
minded voters” (Patton 343).  The party’s stance ensured its survival against the Kemalist secular guard 
but also broadened its voter base by not marketing itself as an openly Islamic party.  But apart from 
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simply marketing, the AKP also took very different ideological positions than was typical of most Islamist 
parties. 
Before the AKP, Islamist parties could be characterized by their rejection of the West, but the 
AKP represented a clear break with this previous Islamist thinking.  The AKP espoused the principles of 
democracy and human rights, ideas which had previously “been despised as prime examples of Western 
concepts that had allegedly adulterated sound Islamic political thought” (Grigoriadis 111).  Through this 
adoption of liberal concepts from an Islamist point of view, the AKP was rewriting the modernity script 
in Turkey; 
“The adoption of these principles of modernity resulted in a paradoxical situation whereby 
former Islamist intellectuals were defending human rights and democracy, pointing to the 
shortcomings of the Kemalist modernization project, which, despite professing modernity, had 
failed to deliver its biggest blessings” (Grigoriadis 114). 
The AKP was reaching out to the pious Muslim population with a new message, criticizing the nature of 
Turkish secularism through the language of democracy and human rights, embracing these concepts of 
Western modernity for their own use (Grigoriadis 111).  The AKP was adapting a Kemalist strategy by 
focusing on the connection between Western concepts and modernity, but altering the very definition 
of modernity for their use to allow for Islamic values and freedom from the harsh suppression of Turkish 
secularism.  In fact, the current AKP Party Platform states that it views “the attitudes and practices 
which disturb pious people, and which discriminate them due to their religious lives and preferences, as 
anti-democratic and in contradiction to human rights and freedoms” (AKParti).  This statement is a clear 
example of the AKP’s use of the Western oriented modernity concepts of democracy and human rights 
in reference to pious individuals, clearing alluding to the suppression and “discrimination” of this group 
by the secular Turkish state.   
It is important note upfront, that for the purposes of this paper, the AKP is still identified as an 
Islamist party.  While the party itself has rejected that title, it remains Islamist in comparison to the 
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typical secular-based and secular promoting parties found in Turkey.  Its policy preferences and actions 
also support this identification.  While the party itself may prefer the conservative-democracy title, 
there is no denying its religious connection, therefore making it an Islamist party within the secular 
status-quo of Turkey.   
The AKP recognized that Turkish society’s modernity is based on westernization.  The AKP 
wanted to continue on this path of westernization, but by altering the definition of modernity.  For the 
AKP, Turkey’s modernity is based economically and democratically, and through joining the EU and 
making appropriate reforms.  The biggest difference is that Turkish society itself should be based on 
Islamic values.  The AKP, while being a reformist Islamist party, desires to change the private/public 
religious relationship by openly acknowledging and utilizing Islam as a social foundation, which is quite 
contrary to Kemalism’s strict secular foundation.  The AKP uses the EU to enact a sense of continuity 
with Kemalist ideas, still using Western ideas as a benchmark of modernity, but by promoting the idea 
that Islam can be modern, and should be an essential component to Turkish modernity.  
The AKP essentially reinvented the Turkish conception of modernity, promoting the idea that 
“traditional Muslim piety and a commitment to Western democratic ideals are not incompatible” 
(Danforth).  This makes it clear that Turkey can have multiple modernities, but affirming the belief that 
modernity itself is a malleable concept that can work as a tool utilized for political gain.  The 
connotations that modernity carries in Turkey are usually far from being associated with Islamist parties, 
but the AKP managed to effectively formulate and promote a distinctive vision that widened the appeal 
to a new kind of religious voter.   
During the 1980’s, the military rule ushered in much needed (and required for IMF loans) 
neoliberal reforms.  These reforms created a new middle class that was more visible and vocal, and 
wanted representation that matched their Islamic values but also met their economic interests; “Capital 
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accumulation by religiously conservative business actors began to translate into distinct political power 
in the 1990s with the rise of conservative parties with roots in political Islam” (Ozel 1096).  The 
traditional anti-Western Islamist parties may have met one criteria, but their rejection of Western 
interests hurt Western-based connections and support and harmed political stability, therefore making 
them bad for business.  But the importance of religious conservatism overcomes business interests, 
particularly as Turkey’s economic landscape had particular cultural changes for the Anatolian-based new 
middle class; “the expansion of the economy has brought yet another set of actors among whom…Islam 
prevails as a carrier of cultural conservatism that safeguards the rigid walls of the traditional family”  
(Birtek and Toprak 199).  Wanting to maintain their conservative culture, Islamist parties gained 
importance among this newly wealthy, but socially traditional group.  The arrival of the AKP ushered in 
the new belief that Western economic policies and democratic ideas were not bad, and in fact, they 
could be used to better the position of Turkey’s more conservative Muslims by fighting back against the 
secular state that represses them. 
The AKP’s vision consists of an “ideological system [based] on Islamic values and principles while 
retaining the political project of modernity, democracy being its major manifestation” (Bazzi 106,107).  
And this ideology and promotion turned out to be a winning formula.  In their first national election in 
2002 the party won with 34 percent of the total vote, a truly impressive number in Turkish politics (Blad 
and Koçer 51).  This success allowed the AKP to lead a single-party government, the first in over ten 
years (Patton).  The AKP’s new language of modernity and focus towards the West attracted much more 
support that the traditional Islamist Felicity Party (founded in the split of the Virtue Party leaders that 
also gave way to the AKP) which only gained 2.5 percent of the votes in the 2002 elections.  This result 
led to 0 seats in parliament for Felicity Party while the AKP won 365, making the AKP’s Islamism the 
obviously more popular and subsequently the most dominant Islamist view (Grigoriadis 111).  
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The focus on the relationship between AKP and Islam is essential to grasping its popularity, as its 
repeated re-elections prove it is true a force to be reckoned with.  But this relationship, especially in the 
beginning, could only carry the AKP so far, and it is important to recognize that its votes likely came from 
a much wider base than the traditional Islamist pool.  The AKP promoted itself to vast segments of 
society, utilizing familiar terms in a new way to emphasize the role that the AKP planned to take was 
going to be different than other parties in Turkey’s history.  The party’s Political vision states that they 
have “opted for a new type of politics by predicating her civilizational values and thus has introduced a 
different type of political vein in Turkish politics” (AKParti).  This illustrates that the AKP bases its politics 
around the uniqueness of its “civilizational values,” meaning its Turkish (read Ottoman) Muslim society.  
This is a perspective quite different than the Kemalist vision, though still utilizing the connection to 
“civilization,” a term Atatürk often used when referencing concepts of modernity and the West.  The 
AKP also claimed that among its competition, it was the best choice for “the transformation of Turkey in 
a globalizing world” (Keyman, “Modernization” 315).  It endorsed its leadership as the only group 
capable of making true, modern changes for the betterment of Turkey and its citizens.  
It was the focus of the AKP on Turkey’s reforms that enabled it to gain so much popularity.  The 
AKP recognized the potential of the Turkish project of modernity, and altered it to serve their needs.  
Through focusing on the changing world around Turkey, the AKP wanted to change Turkey to meet 
these global challenges, while also utilizing its natural strengths (read: Islam).  The AKP utilized the same 
discussion of reform and change to firmly situate itself politically, tailoring its message to reach a broad 
audience.  Even the way that the AKP refers to itself, its dismissal of an Islamist association and the new 
creative way it marketed its ideology was calculated to challenge a narrowing of its political scope or 
goals.  The very idea of the AKP’s ‘conservative democracy’ “borrows from traditional Kemalism, 
rejecting ‘interest’ politics and claiming to represent the whole nation,” evidence of an attempt to 
market to an audience outside of the typical Islamist scope (Glyptis, “Kemalism” 243).  Glyptis, though, 
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acknowledges that of course, politics is still politics; “Conservative democracy is not an ideology, it is a 
survival guide, as the AKP is determined to carry out ‘reforms of a revolutionary nature’” (Kemalism 
243,244).  Painting itself in the image of Atatürk is an interesting political move, but one that certainly 
achieves the goal of attracting voters who may fall under the Kemalist camp, but feel disconnected from 
the current opposition party leadership offerings.   
Through various presentation methods, the AKP loosely connected itself to the ready-made 
mindset of Kemalism, espousing that its goal was to revolutionize society and essentially finally bring 
Turkey to modernity.  The AKP has taken control of a very Turkish way of thinking and utilized it for the 
advancement of their cause.  The AKP was essentially claiming to complete the path to modernity and 
make Turkey a democratic society with a strong economy that will finally join the ranks of the West in 
the EU.  This is how the AKP has successfully fused “Islamic ethics and western modernity.”  For the first 
time, an Islamist party in Turkey established a new way of resolving Turkish culture based in religion, 
with Western concepts of political and economic modernity; “the AKP is blending western standards – 
elevated to the level of universality – and Islam, understood as a distinct source of culture in Turkey” 
(Atasoy 106).    
One of the key components of modernity in Kemalism is secularism, but for the AKP, this is seen 
as an impediment to modernity.  The AKP sees modernity as allowing for a more open outlook on 
religion, and uses the potential for Western ideas to free Islam from Kemalist suppression.  Kösebalaban 
summarizes the AKP’s response as almost a natural reaction against Kemalist dominance;  
“Kemalists continue their radical secularist thinking and through their hold on the political 
establishment continue to impose it on conservative Muslims, forcing the latter to seek and 
embrace tools, such as the EU membership process, to escape from their grip” (92).   
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The AKP has utilized modernity, of which the EU membership process is its main manifestation, against 
the Kemalist establishment.  The AKP is taking the same tools used in the sustainment of Kemalism, 
reinterpreting them, and employing them for their own political gain in spite of Kemalists.   
Though the AKP uses Kemalist lines of thought as political strategies, this does not mean that 
the party actually supports or believes in many Kemalist concepts.  The AKP campaigned that it would 
function within the secular state, but it still openly stated that it wanted to open the conversation on 
religion in Turkey.  To free conservative Muslims, Islamists have adopted and promoted the values of 
Western modernity.  But instead of adopting the same modernity theorized in Kemalism, Islamists have 
“re-conceptualized modernity through a discourse of democracy and human rights, enabling them to 
articulate their spiritual needs as such rights and to renegotiate secularism within a democratic 
framework” (Glyptis, “Kemalism” 209).  The AKP is utilizing these Western concepts to alter its position 
within Turkey.   
Another important platform of the AKP, and demonstration of its Western-oriented goals lies 
within its beliefs about economic reform.  The AKP’s economic ideas helped the party to gain traction 
coming on the heels of a Turkish economic crisis in 2001.  The AKP’s economic goals were to continue 
with neoliberal reforms that they believed were necessary for the stabilization and growth of the 
economy.  Though they promoted these reforms that shed state responsibility, the AKP recognized that 
certain effects may harm some individuals, but still focused on this same issue to make its case for why 
it is needed, and how it would be different under their leadership.   
The AKP has openly acknowledged the issue of deepening inequality in Turkey and promised to 
remedy the sources that have created the poverty, inequality, unemployment, and reliance on an 
informal economy that a sizeable amount of the population is experiencing (Atasoy 109).  Though it 
seems counterintuitive that the AKP would support neoliberal reforms, while using the population’s 
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mass dissatisfaction stemming from previous neoliberal reforms, the difference (and reason for success) 
lies in its method.  The AKP has promoted a type of new social contract in Turkey, essentially its goal is 
“the creation and maintenance of trust between the state and citizens,” which reinforces its program 
“on human welfare, individual freedom, and social justice” (Atasoy 110).  The AKP, through their 
politically reserved but yet open relationship with Islam puts an emphasis on trust that “is culturally 
embedded in the reciprocity of moral obligations and expectations” (Atasoy 110).  This type of thinking 
is foreign to Kemalism and not a prevalent component of Turkish politics.  Kemalism lacks a moral 
reasoning in rule, and the relationship is far from reciprocal: it is the ‘father state.’  The AKP utilizes the 
economy as the state’s obligation (their part in the reciprocity deal).  They believe that with a sound 
economy, citizens will be able to better themselves thanks to their Islamic ‘human capital’ (a concept 
borrowed from the Gülen Movement); “Through self-reliance and self-discipline, individuals endowed 
with an Islamic ethos and morality would be able to fully manage their position in society” (Atasoy 111).  
The AKP operates under the assumption that a more democratic system creates better opportunities for 
individuals (Atasoy 111).  Not only is the focus on the individual completely foreign to Kemalism, but it is 
the focus on the individual which has provided the AKP the legitimacy it required to utilize societal 
discomfort with neoliberal reforms to turn around and utilize that discomfort to promote the same but 
more extensive neoliberal reforms in the country. 
The way that the AKP utilizes Islam in its message while promoting neoliberal reforms ties into 
the promotion of the concept that those in society who are able, will take care of those who need help.  
The AKP places the importance of civil society over that of the state (Dönmez).  For the AKP, 
philanthropy is an essential part of promoting justice in society, as well as playing a “crucial role in the 
process of the AKP’s attempt to enlarge and depend its links with societal groups at large” (Keyman, 
“Modernization” 316).   This emphasis on providing for the poor establishes a moral foundation based 
on Islam, while still being able to follow through with neoliberal reforms that could still be damaging to 
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some members of society.  AKP leaders believe that the state is not the most important player.  Should 
an individual need help, their Islamic community is there and will care for that individual (though the 
AKP and their business and social connections are a part of that community).  The AKP’s economic 
policies have been popular due to their religious, moral, and cultural values, specifically through using 
“religion as a socio-political entity that perceives Islam as an asset of civil society and an instrument to 
control the public sphere” (Dönmez 369).  
The AKP relies on its incredibly successful local governments as well as non-governmental 
organizations to support its Islamic community mission.  The AKP’s success can be directly related to its 
ability to connect different organizations “by using religion as an effective mechanism of mutual trust 
and association” (Dönmez 370).  And through being open to connections with Islamic centered business 
of charitable groups (which are plenty), these new ties have helped to displace the firm hold of Kemalist-
centered organizations (Dönmez 370).   
Also acting to loosen the grip of Kemalist thought in Turkish society was the AKP’s commitment 
to having Turkey join the EU.  The promotion of EU membership represented a clear break with previous 
Islamist parties, but at the same time was a continuation down a path that Turkey had already started.  
The AKP wholeheartedly embraced the EU as an essential goal for Turkey.  This was as much a political 
move as it was ideological.  Promoting EU membership would broaden its appeal to a wider voter 
audience, but the EU also formed the backbone of the AKP’s appeal to modernity.  Within this appeal to 
modernity was the idea that the EU could finally deliver Turkey to its deserved place.  It would finally be 
democratic with a modern economy.  The AKP marketed its appeal for the EU in a way that drew clear 
parallels between how EU-based modernity in Turkey would look versus the current situation, which the 
AKP essentially marketed as not modern; it is undemocratic and suppressing of human rights. 
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By painting the current state as oppressive, the AKP successfully promoted the EU as a provider 
of protection for disadvantaged populations, including Islamists as well as other cultural minorities such 
as Kurds or Alevis.  This further widens the voter base attracted to the AKP through the focus of one 
goal; “The party’s defense of negative freedoms (that limit state power) and societal pluralism has 
enabled it to appeal successfully both to a pro-Islamism constituency and to cosmopolitan liberal voters” 
(Patton 343).  These cosmopolitan voters who may have otherwise voted for the CHP, Atatürk’s 
traditional Kemalist party, or other parties could have been attracted to the AKP for its promotion of the 
EU (Patton). Focusing on the non-Islamists who were drawn to the AKP, it is important to recognize that 
while EU reforms were already being negotiated under the current broad coalition government during 
the AKP’s first election, the traditional Kemalist or nationalist focused groups were actually not generally 
very supportive of Turkey joining the EU (though the military was pro-EU).  While specific problems 
areas will be addressed, the general argument was that EU membership would undermine Kemalist 
nationalism “by assaulting national sovereignty and integrity” (Glyptis, “Kemalism” 222).  But more 
importantly, the main argument that forced Kemalists to withhold support on the EU has to do with 
national security.  Atatürk’s firm nationalism was meant to hold the nation together, but the EU’s 
requirement of certain human rights initiatives would work to recognize and therefore conclusively 
affirm that there are ethnic and religious differences in Turkey, creating a situation that many Kemalists 
fear would jeopardize Turkey’s territorial integrity.  Specifically, there is the concern that “the EU makes 
demands and puts pressure on Turkey without taking its realities, needs and interests into account, thus 
jeopardizing its unitary structure and territorial integrity” (Glyptis, “Kemalism” 235).  While that is the 
alarm, many Turkish citizens, especially during the AKP’s first election, still believed deeply in Turkey 
becoming on EU member, despite what some of the Kemalist elite argued. 
Apart from the territorial question, the major concern of Kemalists about unity is in reference to 
Islamists.  The state’s strong support of secularism is read by the AKP as suppression of the rights of 
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religious individuals.  And in this conflict, the AKP was able to find an alternative to the typical Kemalist 
authoritarian status quo; “Drawing on the de facto legitimacy of EU accession – itself pursued in 
Atatürk’s name – Erdoğan seeks to renegotiate secularism” (Glyptis, “Kemalism” 181).  While secularism 
specifically refers to religion, the state’s strict relationship with secularism is representative of its overall 
oppressive tendencies.  For the remedy of these issues, the AKP constantly referred to the need for 
Turkey to become democratic, and the EU membership goals filled the need for Turkey’s democracy and 
modernity requirements as envisioned by the AKP. 
The AKP promoted democracy that it knew it needed.  The AKP did not want to meet the same 
fate as its predecessors and as a new party promoting a reformist version of Islam, it needed to ensure it 
would not be closed by the constitutional court for anti-secular political activities.  The EU, beacon of 
democracy and modernity was the ticket for political survival and legitimacy (Saatçioğlu).  The AKP’s 
version of Islam was understated yet still understood by the religiously conservative population that it 
was targeted towards.  The answer to gaining more votes was in reaching a wider audience, and nothing 
could fit more easily with the AKP’s promotion of neoliberal economics and democracy than the EU; 
“Europeanization would allow the AKP to expand its electoral support base towards the center and thus 
improve its vote share” (Saatçioğlu 91).  Those who questioned the AKP’s version of political Islam were 
faced with the party’s “compatibility with European liberal democratic values,” creating a seemingly 
abnormal relationship, yet one that provided validity for their direction as well-suited to the Turkish 
state’s goals (Saatçioğlu 91). 
Mehmet Gurses examined the connection between democracy and Islamists after another 
successful election for the AKP in 2007.  His analysis of public opinion indicated “that a positive 
relationship exists between being a religious person and having a favourable attitude towards 
democracy, defined in terms of protecting people’s liberties against oppression.”  Gurses does little in 
the way of drawing conclusions from this data, but it is telling of a link that the AKP exploited for its 
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political promotion.  While Kemalists fear that Islamists would be harmful for Turkey, reverting to a type 
of authoritarian Islamic Dark Age, Islamists are wanted in power by religious people because they feel 
they are more likely to have their democratic rights respected.  They believe that as religious individuals, 
the Turkish state was oppressive of their rights.  The AKP utilized this concept in promoting the 
importance of democracy, essentially making the claim that unlike Kemalists, the AKP believes in 
democracy and individual liberties.   
The AKP’s use of democracy and human rights in the form of EU modernity gave its reform 
programs legitimacy, and so “The AKP has made its political survival contingent on the EU integration 
process” (Patton 343).  By promoting Turkey’s EU bid, the AKP seized the idea of westernization from its 
monopoly by Kemalists and were able to use it as their foundation for making major changes within 
Turkey (Grigoriadis 112).  The AKP’s “Opting for the thoroughly Kemalist path of a ‘revolution from 
above,’” allowed them to implement changes that would be likely not be tolerated if they weren’t done 
in the name of EU accession (Glyptis, “Kemalism” 244).  Though the AKP’s embracing of this Western 
idea of modernity through the EU allowed them to differentiate themselves as a center-right party and 
not an Islamism party, there was talk at the beginning about their true motives.  However, these 
concerns could be dispelled through the watch of the EU, as surely if the AKP planned to make changes 
to the Turkish state it would be limited by the close eye of the EU.   
The EU can be utilized for better electoral chances by “creating an electoral coalition 
encompassing different societal groups which will benefit from accession,” which is exactly what the 
AKP was able to do (Baudner 926).  They ran under the banner of EU-based reforms, and EU 
membership was seen as beneficial to disadvantaged groups, such as Kurds and even strongly religious 
individuals as the AKP argued.  Some of the secular middle class who found EU membership an essential 
move for Turkey could also be gathered into the AKP’s electoral bloc as well as liberals looking to the EU 
as a way to avert the oppressive Kemalist regime.  Allowing Turkey to be anchored to the EU combined 
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with more democratic and neoliberal reforms was also very important to the business community, and 
the AKP also gained votes from some in this group as well (Ozel).  It is clear overall that the AKP 
benefited greatly from their support of the EU in Turkish domestic politics. 
Still running under the banner of reform, in 2007, the AKP faced its second national election.  In 
the 2002 election, the AKP won 34% of the vote which was already a remarkable number.  The second 
time around the AKP won 47% of the of the vote; “the largest share for a single party since the elections 
of 1957, and it was only the second occasion since 1954, in which the incumbent party significantly 
increased its vote share in a subsequent election” (Keyman, “Modernization” 314).  This was truly an 
impressive feat.  In the most recent 2011 election AKP increased its vote share to 50% (Blad and Koçer 
51).  It is clear that the AKP’s message has been successful, though it has developed along an interesting 
path. Keyman summarizes the AKP’s political ideals with its success;  
“As a center-right globalist political actor, with proactive, reformist, market-oriented and 
philanthropic politics, not only has the AKP achieved its electoral hegemony, but it has also 
developed a strong, convincing claim that it can act as the main actor and carrier of the process 
of transforming Turkey” ( Keyman, “Modernization” 320). 
And many transformations Turkey has certainly seen over this period of AKP rule.  What these changes 
mean for Turkey is a big question society is currently asking itself.  And the concern over the future of 
modernity in the country is very real, especially as a new election year is here and social unrest in Turkey 
has grown. 
Contributing to this unrest is the fact that with the highest turnout since 1987 with an 87% voter 
participation rate in the last election, though nearly 50% of Turkey voted for the AKP, there was 
essentially another half of the country that placed their votes elsewhere (“Turkish Elections”).  And 
while this proves the popularity of the AKP, it is important to understand the extreme differences that 
have developed between the half of society that wants AKP rule and the other half which does not.  The 
continued electoral supremacy of the AKP contributes to these social issues.  When the AKP continued 
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to earn almost half of the votes in two subsequent national elections after first coming to power, each 
success solidified their ruling presence, but more importantly, it further marginalized the opposition 
parties.  As Keyman observes, “it becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the opposition 
parties to gain electoral success and govern Turkey, which leads to the increasing pessimism and 
frustration of their voters about their identity, status, and position in society” (“Modernization” 314).  
The AKP’s electoral dominance  makes it so the opposition parties “have no claim to win the elections in 
a convincing way, but also, and more importantly, the supporters of these parties lose their faith in their 
own parties’ electoral success” (Keyman, “Modernization” 314,315).  AKP dominance is clearly good for 
the AKP and its supporters, but it has created a situation that does nothing to help calm the tense 
atmosphere of division in Turkish politics that has now unequivocally affected society.   
Even the mere mention of the AKP elicits very passionate reactions among some in Turkish 
society.  Its dominance makes Kemalist oriented individuals feel as if there is no escape from their 
tyranny, and that they are actively and purposefully diminishing Turkey’s progress towards modernity as 
they define it.  Its success and policies have not only generated “powerful social and political 
polarizations within political and civil society and institutional clashes between state elite and 
government,” but have created deep fissures among citizens leading to very public hostilities (Keyman, 
“Modernization” 315).  There is no denying that “the more the AKP becomes the dominant actor of 
Turkey’s recent transformation, the more it has been subject to criticism, skepticism and reaction, 
leading to… societal polarization” (Keyman, “Modernization” 323).  While the AKP’s origins may have 
been relatively regular, its current strength, its unusual journey, and its position as the source of much 
anger and anxiety among some and yet pride and gratitude from others has proven its impact on Turkish 
politics and the concept of modernity in Turkey will have lasting impacts on society.   
 
55 
 
TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION  
Since the inception of the AKP, the party has had the ability to use an important invention of 
modernity in a way that has deeply impacted their time in power and which they have benefitted greatly 
from: the EU.  Where Kemalists may have seen the EU as an important step towards finally achieving 
modernity, they also viewed it with inherent suspicion.  Striving towards the West, what can be 
considered as modernization as self-defense, has always been a Kemalist goal.  This helps to explain and 
perpetuate the fear of Western powers working to divide and harm Turkey is also a natural component 
of Kemalist thought (Demir).  Joining the EU would require changes and sacrifices that Kemalists were 
warming up to, but not fully ready to embrace.  The AKP on the other hand, used the EU as campaign 
piece, making it clear from the outset that joining the EU was a goal for the party and an important step 
for Turkey.   
EU membership “would offer Turkey the means and support to complete its modernization 
project and reach the level of contemporary civilization,” finally achieving Atatürk’s dream.  But the 
leadership of the AKP in taking Turkey to the EU illustrates an interesting deviation in Atatürk’s plan.  
Not only is Turkey being led to the EU by an Islamist party, but his own supporters, followers of what is 
widely believed to be the ideology of their long-passed leader (though severely transformed) are not 
particularly supportive of this plan.  But this predicament also represents the duality of the EU, its 
meaning has always caused confliction in Turkey; 
“The EU is both a threat and an opportunity, the object of both admiration and profound 
mistrust.  Does it represent the West that Atatürk warned his children against?  Or does it 
represent progress; a force Atatürk believed could be neither resisted nor negotiated?” (Glyptis, 
“Kemalism” 218) 
This mindset explains the long and more recently, in some ways changing, path of progress and public 
opinion of Turkey concerning the EU.  Turkey has long wanted to join the EU for many reasons, the most 
important of which may be that Turkey wants to solidify its belief that it is and has always been “of 
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Europe.”  Yet when it seemed that the EU was finally within reach, things have taken a different turn, 
and Turkey’s journey over the past several decades has left it at an interesting, confounding place. 
The domestic politics of Turkey are complex, and the EU has compounded this situation by 
(inadvertently) highlighting the divisions in society, asking for reforms that question the very nature of 
the Turkish state, and by “taking sides” with a party that is currently equally loved and deeply distrusted.  
The role of the EU has done more than raise concerns over national sovereignty and integrity, causing 
many to wonder; “Is the pursuit of EU membership forwarding westernization at the expense of 
Kemalist nationalism?” (Glyptis, “Kemalism” 222).  Have the changes that Turkey has undergone in the 
name of the EU worth the price of the disruption it has created?   And now that the AKP has achieved 
and maintained hegemony, due in great part to its EU connection, and passed many social and structural 
changes that have fundamentally challenged Kemalism, the very meaning of modernity in Turkey has 
been questioned.  Kemalist modernity is alive, but it is struggling against a new modernity that allows 
religion to play a bigger role in society and government, a conception that was supported by employing 
the values that the EU represents.  The AKP and the EU have created a crossroads for modernity in 
Turkey, and only in tracing the journey can Turkey’s current position be understood.   
A PERFECT PAIR? THE AKP AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Within the conversation of modernity, the EU represents an important paradigm.  The AKP has 
presented itself as concerned with Turkey’s modernity, and has chosen to develop this direction through 
the association of the EU.  Western economic reforms and democracy are the AKP’s definition of 
modernity which it has manifested itself in the party’s EU dream.  But placing the AKP’s modernity, and 
therefore their goals for Turkish modernity, into the EU is not a new concept.  This of course follows 
Atatürk’s westernization as modernization model, but the EU is a new, formal organization that 
effectively exports the pertinent European values to those wishing to join its exclusive club.  The EU has 
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shaped itself as the dominant normative power, using its organization as an "opportunity to impose its 
conception of modernity and development through accession; modernity ‘legitimated around a 
collective identity based on liberal norms of capitalist democracy’” (Kaliber 31).  Europeanization 
through the EU allows for a new development in modernity, one that necessitates “transition from a 
state-centric monolithic modernization to a more pluralistic, inclusive, and participatory paradigm” 
(Kaliber 32).  
The AKP effectively adapted this strategy to suit their domestic political needs, creating a new 
notion of Turkish modernity.  The use of the EU as a tool in domestic politics is not certainly not new 
with Turkey, and the general desire to be a part of the EU while recognizing its inherent flaws and 
negative perceptions is well utilized by accession candidates and members alike.  For candidate 
countries though, domestic actors who support the EU can “use opportunities and constraints emerging 
from Europeanization at the expense of their rivals” (Kaliber 34).  The AKP understood that the EU 
would help them achieve power domestically while also directing their reform goals to be manifested 
within the accession processes of the EU.  This allowed them to make changes in the name of reform 
while also reflecting the problems or negativity of those changes back onto the EU and away from the 
party.   
In 2004 Erdoğan gave a speech at Oxford arguing that Turkey had made significant progress at 
EU harmonization and “despite some failures and delays, he declared Turkey to be ready and eager to 
join” (Glyptis, “Rapprochement” 402).  At another point Erdoğan stated that the Copenhagen criteria 
should be called the ‘Ankara criteria,’ highlighting the importance of the reforms for Turkey itself.  
Erdoğan’s use of the “Ankara Plan” idea was essentially saying that Turkey’s current reform process “is 
important in itself and should not be overly dependent on the ambition to become a full EU member” 
(Öniş 366).  Glyptis argues that Turkey’s membership quest will require that “the normative core of 
political activity and institutions in Turkey…need not simply to adapt but radically change” 
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(“Rapprochement” 402).  And in the early years of the AKP along with Erdoğan’s speeches, it seems as 
though the AKP recognized this fact.  Not only did the EU represent a chance for domestic political 
power, but also an opportunity to fundamentally change the structure of the Turkish state through EU 
reforms.   
The AKP began its fundamental changes early, “launching four harmonization packages and 
adopting constitutional amendments until 2004” (G. Yilmaz 305).   These initial reforms focused on 
increasing democracy, specifically focusing on freedom of speech and civil-military relations (G. Yilmaz).  
These reform packages were fueled in part by the AKP’s relative power position in government.  After 
the AKP’s 2002 elections, they had a two-thirds majority which allowed them to “motion constitutional 
amendments as a single party” (Kalaycıoğlu 276).  Their situation allowed them to essentially act freely 
(within reason to public opinion and sights for future dominance, of course).  Not needing to seek 
compromises with other parliamentary groups, the AKP “won the potential to act alone in projecting its 
own priorities and vision” into constitutional amendments (Kalaycıoğlu 276).  For a party advocating 
major reform, Turkey’s odd electoral system created a dream situation for the AKP, one that allowed 
them the freedom and ability to push through legislation to achieve their EU goals.   
Oniş refers to the Turkey-EU golden age as occurring from the summer of 2002, which includes 
the reform package passed from the coalition government before the AKP came to power, up until 
October 2005, when the official accession negotiations began (363).  This “golden age” conception 
coincides with the early years of the AKP, but its timeline is regularly adopted by those examining the 
EU-Turkey relationship which commonly neglects the important work done before the AKP came to 
power.  Coalition work to meet the EU Copenhagen Criteria had already resulted in several 
constitutional amendments before the AKP, including a highly comprehensive set of amendments in 
2001 (Kalaycıoğlu 271).  The 34 articles that were amended at this time improved human rights, 
restructured democratic institutions, and strengthened rule of law (Glyptis, “Rapprochement” 402).  The 
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Turkish government had proven its willingness to work together to make changes, and so the AKP was 
not starting from the beginning, nor were its ideas for reform radical.   Rather it was its belief that the 
Turkish state as a whole needed radical transformation was the new and drastic notion (and by 
extension, the Kemalist structures and thinking that upheld the current status quo). 
And while it is true that the AKP initially made many reforms towards EU requirements, it is 
clear by the present relationship between the AKP and the EU that the situation is currently much 
different.  The AKP’s enthusiasm for EU reforms “slowed perceptibly in 2005 and noticeably in 2006 as 
contraindications of a willingness to stand behind the reforms attracted commentary from international 
and local observers” (Patton 340).  Of course the AKP had the power to push forward EU reforms if it 
wished, but it is important to acknowledge the general shift in overall opinion in Turkey towards the EU, 
and as a political actor, it of course must respond to domestic outlook.  This is important in 
understanding the connection between the AKP and the reforms it has promoted before and since this 
period in which EU enthusiasm lessened. 
There are two main arguments typically cited for the change in attitude by Turkey, led by the 
AKP, about EU membership.  Both issues concern the EU’s concept of conditionality, which is the general 
process by which the EU influences states’ actions in exchange for the reward of membership.  For 
Turkey, the struggle is with the legitimacy of the EU’s reward.  The EU was slow to announce Turkey’s 
official candidacy while still accepting ten new candidates for admission in 2004, while deferring two 
candidates for admission in 2007 (Glyptis, “Rapprochement” 406).  At the end of 2004 the EU 
announced that Turkey’s negotiations would begin in October of 2005, yet unlike the previous twelve 
candidates, the EU failed to provide a timeline for accession.  Patton referred to this situation as the EU 
sending “mixed signals, extending in one hand the carrot of accession talks and waving a stick in the 
other hand warning that negotiations could be suspended at any time” (344).  It was these kinds of 
mixed signals that fueled the belief that the EU was membership process was simply unfair to Turkey.  
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According to Patton, it was during this time that “the Turkish public was rapidly convinced by the media 
that their country was being treated differently from other candidate countries” (344).  And there are 
some issues, particularly surrounding the Cyprus problem, where it could be argued that Turkey was 
held to a different standard than other countries, and was in fact treated unfairly.   
There were also events of Turkish EU membership criticisms coming from EU countries which 
did little to help quell EU wariness in Turkey.  There were serious concerns over whether the EU would 
really ever let Turkey join.  The perceived (and very real, in some cases) ill-treatment stemming from the 
EU generated “feelings of humiliation and indignation” which helped to fuel a nationalist backlash within 
Turkey (Patton 345).  The EU’s lack of clear membership prospects for Turkey raised concern and 
suspicion about EU motives.  This situation did little to persuade Kemalists to support the EU and it also 
did not encourage the AKP to maintain EU momentum.  The yardstick of Europe that Atatürk had used 
to measure modernity was seen as essentially saying Turkey was simply not good enough.  Turkey felt 
that the EU was saying it was not “modern” enough, a serious blow to the mindset of many Turks who 
felt that they had always belonged to Europe and were deserving of membership, even more so than 
some of the recent countries granted admission to the EU.   
Just as the AKP had promoted the EU which had helped provide a political advantage, other 
parties, particularly the nationalist parties, were quick to use this new situation as fuel against the AKP 
and the EU.  This further enhanced the concerns of more nationalist and Kemalist parties wondering if 
the concessions Turkey had to make to join the EU were worth the trouble.  This only contributed to the 
conflict surrounding modernity and the role of the EU in the Kemalist and AKP conceptions.  For 
example, the CHP isn’t necessarily anti-EU, “but finds itself uncomfortable with the conditionality 
associated with a EU membership and the ramifications of the democratization- and reform process” 
(Öniş 369).  The EU represented modernity as a goal to strive for Kemalists, but with the questionable 
credibility of their membership offer, the EU also represented Turkey’s modernity and strengths without 
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needing their approval.  This was embodied in a sort of nationalist backlash to prove Turkey is modern in 
spite of the EU, and is fine, if not better, without EU membership.  
Overall, the EU fervor in Turkey was allayed during this time, with favorable views of the EU 
falling from 58% in 2004 to only 27% in 2007.  However, support for joining the EU wasn’t totally 
extinguished, with 68% of the population in 2005 still supporting Turkey becoming a member of the EU 
and only 27% opposed (“Turks Divided”).  However, the concerns over EU legitimacy are necessary to 
take into account when considering the AKP’s overall EU relationship and actions done in the name of 
EU accession.  Though the population saw a decline in support for EU membership over the next several 
years, dropping to 54% supporting Turkey joining the EU 2010 with 40% opposed (with those views 
being stable through early 2014) the AKP never abandoned it as a main goal for the party.  Though it 
may have backed off from its enthusiasm for some reforms, its continued support and subsequent EU 
reforms have contributed to a mixed picture of what the AKP’s goals are.  While it can be argued that 
the AKP might simply not have made it to the Europeanization stage where it adapted and embodied 
the EU’s goals as its own, Patton sees that there may have been other factors behind its actions; “while 
social learning requires time, insufficient socialization does not explain why the AKP aggressively pushed 
reforms for two years and then backed off” (340).   
The AKP was successful in making the EU of the focus of their first term in government and 
continued that push through their second national election, though it ended shortly after that.  With the 
2007 national elections the AKP earned wider support through their larger percentage of total votes.  
This represented “a major opportunity for the AKP to revitalize the Europeanization and reform 
agenda,” and follow up on its purported goals of reforms that would bring Turkey closer to the EU (Öniş 
366).  But this would be a missed opportunity on both sides.  The EU failed to demand more reforms or a 
concerted effort towards accession criteria from the AKP, and the AKP, rather than pushing forward with 
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further EU reforms, “increasingly shifted towards the promotion of fundamental religious freedoms,” 
(such as the headscarf issue which will be addressed later) (Öniş 366).   
Full Europeanization only works through continued and effective reform; “Domestic changes 
occurs when the actors holding social and political capital learn and internalize European rules, norms 
and institutions so as to redefine their identities and interests” (Kaliber 34).  And it is clear from Turkey’s 
current relationship with the EU, that there has been a detectable shift in the overall attitude of the AKP 
towards EU reforms and membership, and therefore true Europeanization has not happened in Turkey.  
The AKP, while not totally abandoning the EU project, has minimized its importance, while still 
continuing to complete EU reforms.  The AKP has persisted with “patchy and selective Europeanization” 
(G. Yilmaz 305).  It is the ‘selectiveness’ of the AKP’s reforms that have played a large role in deciphering 
their true conception of modernity and what ‘radical transformations’ it had in mind for the Turkish 
state.  Baudner has a supportive (and rather lengthy) explanation for why some actors (in this case, the 
AKP) have a strong reason to attach themselves to the EU; 
 “Political actors who are systematically disadvantaged by the well-entrenched domestic 
standard of legitimacy…have strong incentives to embrace the European standard of legitimacy, 
once three preconditions are fulfilled: European norms must be supportive of the interests of 
domestic actors; they must offer domestic actors an advantage in the political system of the 
state in question, or must be perceived to do so; and these actors must also be prepared to 
accept modifications of the political programme imposed by EU norms, possibly even against 
the resistance of important parts of the electorate or membership of the party in question” 
(925). 
The AKP met these three conditions as demonstrated through their early journey.  The AKP was certainly 
“systematically disadvantaged” by the military and Kemalist state structure, giving them reason to adopt 
the EU as an important cause.  More importantly, this helps to explain their continued, but minimized, 
support for the EU while carrying out further selective reforms.  This is not to deny that the AKP may 
have truly believed in EU membership, but it necessary to consider its support for the EU in the context 
of Turkey’s domestic political situation. 
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MAJOR EU REFORMS: MINORITIES AND THE MILITARY 
The EU has made many requests of Turkey to prepare for accession.  The acquis communautaire 
and its 35 chapters contain extensive rules and regulations necessary to adopt to be considered for 
membership, and some reforms are easier implemented than others.  But some of the changes that 
Turkey needs to make are extensive and structural, possibly taking several rounds of legislation to 
complete reforms to a level the EU will accept.  The reforms Turkey must complete are numerous, but 
there are several areas that help to highlight the role of the AKP and address the underlying structures 
that relate to Turkish modernity.  Specifically, two of the largest and most important reforms in this area 
are in regards to Turkey’s treatment of their minorities and the transformation of the civilian-military 
relationship in Turkish government.   
Concerning the EU’s required reforms concerning minorities, its interests are usually directed at 
the treatment of Turkey’s large Kurdish population.  The 1982 Turkish constitution implemented during 
military rule specifically banned the Kurdish language, including giving Kurdish names to children and 
renaming Kurdish villages with Turkish names.  This sort of cultural and linguistic suppression is not only 
seen as an infringement upon what the EU considers minority rights, but it also is closely related to the 
destructive civil war between the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the Turkish army (Zeydanıoğlu 11).  
This war contributed to the mass movement of more than one million people around and from south 
and southeast Anatolia and can be blamed for over 40,000 deaths (Keyman, “Rethinking” 468).  The 
reactions over the PKK conflict that has killed Turkish soldiers and civilians (though, along with many 
Kurdish civilians) has encouraged a severe nationalist backlash centered on Turkishness.  This has only 
deepened the mistrust between Turks and Kurds, creating a situation seemingly without a possible 
solution.  The position of ethnicity at the center of such a bloody conflict is a serious concern of political 
instability to the EU.   
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The problem with the recognition of the Kurds is a deep issue going back to the founding of the 
Republic with the purposeful neglect to identify Kurds as a distinct ethnic group for fear of damaging the 
new state’s territorial integrity.  The Kemalist rebuttal for Kurds is usually directed at their 
traditionalism, the problems impacting the rest of the country are more than simply socioeconomic 
underdevelopment or separatist terrorism, “It has to do with the difficult question of how to politically 
organize a multiethnic and multicultural society without endangering the legitimacy of the polity and its 
state” (Keyman, “Rethinking” 474).  Kemalism does not allow for the recognition of Kurds as a separate 
ethnic group or even a division of Turkish society that should be allowed its own language or culture.  
Their heightened presence is disruptive to the unity of the state.  The EU needs Turkey to recognize the 
Kurds as a separate, distinct ethnic group that is deserving of equal rights and treatment.  
Typically the military has been a supporter of the Kemalist doctrine, but as addressed earlier, 
the military was for joining the EU and in relation to the Kurdish issue, the military could also be 
understood as generally supportive.  The “EU membership process would provide a framework to deal 
with the Kurdish issue” which would remove the military from making decisions concerning Kurds and 
place the responsibility with politicians who, especially when working with the legitimacy of the EU, 
could likely resolve the issue in a way that would be too politically unpopular to do otherwise (Ersel, 
Özcan, and Dogan 7).  The military is pragmatic in their view of the Kurdish issue, concerning themselves 
with internal security, but also acknowledging their role the ones responsible in the event of further 
military conflict.  Regardless of which party anyone in Turkey sides with, there is no denying that the 
situation needs a solution.    
Placing the solution in the hands of the EU seems the only means for achieving a solution of any 
kind.  The AKP, promoting the necessity of EU membership, is actually the only group likely capable of 
being able to establish such reforms due to the fact that its party platform doesn’t rest on the 
nationalist beliefs held by other popular parties.  However, regardless of the absence of promoting the 
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typical nationalist fervor, it does not mean that providing an answer to the “Kurdish problem” is 
completely politically salient or easy for the AKP.  Like most Turks, the AKP is distrustful of the Kurds and 
not willing to easily hand over rights.  Though a solution may be politically unpopular with Turks, the EU 
was still something that many wanted.  It is certainly popular with Kurds as it would provide them with 
the rights they have been fighting for, which could prove as a solution that actually protects territorial 
integrity as they would have less of a push to claim their own land if they were simply treated as equal 
citizens.   
Under the prodding of the EU, the AKP did initiate a "'democratic opening' process to enlarge 
the rights and freedoms of Kurds, whose implementation covers the areas of education, media, and 
culture” (Keyman, “Rethinking” 474,475).  Specifically, in a 2004 reform package the Kurdish language 
was again allowed to be used in public as well as in educational settings where it could be taught 
(though not for use in state schools) (Baudner, Patton).  This package also included a provision that 
granted permission for limited television broadcasting in Kurdish (Baudner 932). 
In relation to the concerns that Turkey has been treated unfairly in the accession process, the 
treatment of minorities is certainly a sensitive area.  Turkey’s concerns about the Kurds is in regard to 
territorial integrity, a concern that is shared by some EU members and their own numerous minority 
groups (Tasch 44).  But current members are not subject to the same strict protocol as candidates, and 
such a concern is likely to remain, the EU wanting to ensure that it upholds the human rights values it 
claims to value strongly.  But in this case the EU truly does represent a solution to a problem that has 
otherwise been seen as unfixable in the Turkish context.  Politically, it is unpopular to discuss giving 
Kurds more rights, but the AKP did take small steps to fulfill EU requirements, although minimally only 
through the reforms discussed above.  The AKP could benefit politically from better relationships with 
Kurds, but while they have metaphorically kept the door open for further reforms, more changes have 
not been forthcoming.  After the initial reform package that addressed minority rights (much like in 
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other areas), the AKP has not produced any further major expansion of rights, and it has continued to 
remain a topic of domestic political contention where any major concessions would now likely be very 
unpopular. 
The reforms regarding the military in Turkey are certainly the most complex due to the position 
of the military in the government and political system.  The EU’s expectation was that the military be 
brought under civilian control to meet the standards of liberal democracy as seen in Europe in the same 
civil-military relationship area.  The altering of the military’s deeply embedded relationship with the 
state started in 1999 when the Turkish government began focusing on deeper EU reforms aimed at 
democracy (Ersel, Özcan, and Dogan).  This process has taken many levels of reforms, and it is one area 
where the AKP has continued to pressure and pass reforms regardless of the status of the existing 
relationship with the EU.  The reforms surrounding the military have wider impacts throughout society, 
as bringing the military under civilian control alters the position of guardian role that the military has 
held dear as an essential part of their organization. 
To reaffirm the position of the military (as with the Kurdish issue), the military was not anti-EU.  
The EU represented the epitome of modernity.  It would allow the military to be a European army and 
lead the country to the pinnacle of modernization that Atatürk had wanted.  However, the military 
recognized that “the EU accession process created a situation in which the guardian and vanguard roles 
of the military contradicted each other” (Gürsoy, “Changing Role” 745).  Should the military have 
rejected the EU, it would have become unpopular due to what was then very large public support for EU 
membership, and such a move would have also been contradictory to the Western-oriented focus that 
the military attempted to portray through its coups and state-structured guidance (Gürsoy, “Changing 
Role” 745).  The military recognized that to lead Turkey down the path it saw as best (towards the EU), it 
would have to relinquish part of its guardian role.  In the end, membership in the EU would make the 
military’s guardian role unnecessary for the most part, even though the journey would be difficult and 
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raise important internal and external security issues for military to learn to deal with in new ways.  
Overall, the military “believed that the reform process must be controlled as much as possible so that 
the armed forces would not lose all of their privileges” (Gürsoy, “Changing Role” 745).  
EU demands have focused mostly on the National Security Council, and the reforms enacted 
have since “changed the powers, function and composition of the NSC” (Gürsoy, “Impact” 295).  Each 
reform has essentially peeled back layers of military control in the organization that allowed the military 
to function “almost as a second pillar of the executive through the NSC, especially in matters of external 
and internal security” (Gürsoy, “Impact” 295).  The first major amendment in 2001 increased the 
number of civilians in NSC meetings.  A much bigger reform package passed in the early years of the AKP 
in 2003 made the NSC a strictly advisory body, a reversal of power matching the 1961 constitution made 
after the first military coup.  This also allowed the secretary general of the council to be a civilian and 
moved the power to choose this individual to the Prime Minister with approval from the president.  
Several other reform components vastly increasing the role of civilians has not only led to a decrease in 
the military’s power within the body, but also “a decrease in the military’s control over the agenda 
(Gürsoy, “Impact” 295).  In 2004 another reform package allowed civilian supervision over the military’s 
budget and removed military members from civilian boards including the very significant Council of 
Higher Education.  Other reforms limited the role of the military in the judiciary, which then functioned 
as another stronghold of Kemalists (Gürsoy, “Impact”).  Giving civilians control overall military 
promotions and dismissals is another example of the type of reforms made in the name of EU accession 
(Ersel, Özcan, and Dogan).   
While all of these moves are essential for Turkey to move towards the liberal democracy that 
the EU wanted, given Turkey’s unique history and relationship with its military, these changes were very 
big.  The military may have had fears about the AKP when they were first elected; as time continued and 
their power eroded very quickly, it seemed as if their fears were justified.  However, fighting against the 
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EU reforms still remained difficult due to public opinion and particularly now that they had basically lost 
their institutional mechanism (the NSC) for controlling government actions (Aknur).  However, some 
senior military members who were against certain reforms utilized informal mechanisms including 
speeches and statements to try and influence politics (Aknur 137).  This period has been categorized by 
Aknur as a time of “open-conflict” between the AKP and military, but this relationship would soon come 
to a head over the direction of the state, and the EU reforms would prove the new, subordinate position 
of the military.   
In early 2007, the AKP was gearing up for their second national elections that this time coincided 
with the end of the President’s term in office.  As the AKP had majority control over parliament, the 
natural expectation would be that the AKP would nominate Prime Minister Erdoğan to the presidency.  
Unsurprisingly, the military feared the AKP having control over the presidency and the parliament, 
particularly after its own power had been diminished (Gürsoy, “Impact”).  However, the AKP changed 
their presidential candidate to another party member, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül (Aknur).  Still 
unhappy with this decision, before the parliament could vote, the military issued a declaration through 
its website, sometimes referred to as the “e-memorandum” or “e-coup” (though very much not a coup).  
The memorandum stated their concern as “the certain defenders of secularism” and that they would 
also “openly and clearly put forward their attitudes and behavior when necessary” (Hurriyet qtd. In 
Gürsoy, “Impact” 296).  This statement is clearly a thinly veiled threat against the AKP over the military’s 
fear of their undermining of secularism.  The presidential crisis led to demonstrations against the AKP in 
Istanbul and Ankara, also promoting the belief that the AKP was a danger to Turkish secularism (Gürsoy, 
“Changing Role” 746).  However, there was the general feeling still (even amongst protestors) that a 
coup was not the solution, proof that Kemalism had possibly been reformed through Europeanization 
and that even those supporting Kemalist ideas had begun to accept new definitions of what was an 
acceptable component of Turkish modernity.   
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Regardless of the e-memorandum the presidential vote still went through and there was no 
significant military intervention.  However, shortly after the vote the Constitutional Court rejected the 
vote on a technicality.  As a result “the AKP called for a new general election to resolve the impasse, 
and, after renewing its mandate in parliament, the party elected Gül to the presidency” (Gürsoy, 
“Impact” 296).  The outcome of the military’s interference was that the AKP ran another successful 
campaign espousing the importance of democracy, and was able to use the military as a clear example 
of how Turkey was still undemocratic.  The AKP won almost half of the votes and in the end, the feelings 
towards the role of the military in Turkey had noticeably shifted (Gürsoy, “Changing Role” 746).  Feelings 
of confidence toward the military in Turkey noticeably shifted in public opinion polls after 2007, with 
people who said they do not have confidence in the military increasing five percentage points in 2008.  
This trend continued, resulting in lower trust levels for the Turkish military than in EU societies in 2010 
when only 69% of people had confidence in the military, down from around 88% in 2007 (Gürsoy, 
“Public Opinion” 108,109). 
 After the 2007 elections, the AKP “felt much stronger and more secure about controlling politics 
and placing pressure on the military” (Aknur 138).  Aknur argues that after the failure of the e-
memorandum and the AKP’s significant electoral victory that the military moved from open conflict with 
the AKP to what he calls “silent protest” (139).  This period of silent protest was marked by the 
acceptance that without the NSC, the military had no clear avenue to interrupt the AKP government.   
Another blow to the military also occurred during this time.  In June 2007 an investigation 
known as the Ergenekon case began.  This event led to the trial and some arrests of over 300 people 
“including journalists, academics and retired and active duty military officers from various ranks” since 
October of 2008 (Gürsoy, “Changing Role” 736).  This investigation and subsequent trial concerned 
alleged coup plots against the AKP government between 2003 and 2004 (Gürsoy, “Impact” 297).  This 
trouble was furthered by another investigation and subsequent trial known as Balyoz in early 2010 
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(Gürsoy, “Changing Role” 736).  This trial included around 200 military officers and concerned 
“conspiracies allegedly planned to manipulate public opinion and the media by carrying out 
psychological warfare and false flag operations” (Gürsoy, “Impact” 297).  The plots were to create chaos 
in Turkey which would “create favourable conditions for the military to step in and stage a legitimate 
coup” (Gürsoy, “Impact” 297).   
One tenth of the military’s generals and admirals were arrested in the two cases, certainly no 
small number (Gürsoy, “Changing Role” 736).  In both of these trials the outcome was that many military 
officers including several very high ranking officers as well as “journalists, businessmen, ultra-
nationalists and representatives of civil society organizations, were sentenced to lengthy prison terms 
for attempting to plan coups to overthrow the government” (Aknur 139, 140).  There was a noticeable 
backlash against the military in the aftermath of the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials that led to a diminished 
public opinion about their role in Turkish politics and also resulted in a loss of the military’s informal 
mechanisms for influence such as speeches and press conferences (Aknur 132).  The public opinion of 
those believing that the military was having a good effect on the country fell from 85% in 2007 to 72% in 
2010, and even farther down to 55% in 2014 (“Turks Divided”).  These trials have undeniably had a 
strong impact on how the public feels about the military as a part of society. 
However, there have been doubts about the facts surrounding both cases, with some seeing 
“the only common denominator that brings suspected individuals together is their opposition to the AKP 
government” (Gürsoy, “Impact” 298).  Unreliable evidence produced in the Ergenekon case and the 
Balyoz case raised serious doubts about the impartiality and legality of the judiciary (Gürsoy, “Changing 
Role” 750; Aknur 146).  While some may have believed in the validity of the cases, for others they 
“raised doubts about the intentions of the AKP and whether the government is using the allegations to 
weaken and harm the reputation of the military” (Gürsoy, “Changing Role” 736).  The EU took notice of 
these trials in their 2011 and 2012 Progress Reports on Turkey as the trials were nearing completion.  
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The Reports noted issues such as the general secrecy surrounding the investigations, failure to provide 
evidence used in indictments, problems surrounding pre-trial detention for the accused, and 
“excessively long and catch-all indictments” (European Commission 2012 7).  The EU concluded it had 
many concerns over the judicial process, striking a note of irony about the EU’s wishes.  Removal of the 
institutional role of military by the AKP was desired by the EU, but when the AKP overstepped 
democratic boundaries in the process of the trials, the EU took note to criticize this development.  
Within Turkey, the cases also had the effect of demonstrating that the AKP had infiltrated and politicized 
the judiciary which was formerly seen as a Kemalist stronghold (Gürsoy, “Changing Role” 750).  
The Balyoz case took an interesting turn in March and April 2015 when the almost 300 suspects 
and remaining defendants were acquitted during a retrial.  The retrial was ordered in June 2014 after an 
extensive purge of the judiciary occurred in early 2014 in an act of “government retaliation” for the 
exposed corruption scandal involving the AKP and Erdoğan himself.  It was ruled that evidence used in 
the case was fabricated and inadmissible in court.  In a speech at the Turkish War Colleges, Erdoğan 
claimed that the trials and accusation were the product of the “parallel state” within Turkey, referring to 
the Gülen Movement that has become a very public enemy to the AKP as of late.  Claiming he had been 
deceived, Erdoğan then blamed the case (which concerned coup plots against the AKP government by 
the military) as an instrument of a real coup plan for Turkey orchestrated by the “parallel state” (“Court 
Acquits”).  This turn of events confirms the suspicions surrounding the original trial, but the acquittals 
and subsequent blame of the Gülen Movement for planning a real coup only deepens concerns about 
the AKP’s motives and intentions surrounding anyone perceived as an enemy to the party.   
Along with these two major cases, the AKP also passed a constitutional amendment package 
that made it possible to try those responsible for the 1980 and 1997 coups as well (Aknur 140).  These 
reforms went along with other changes aimed at reducing the control and power of the military in 
several areas including military promotions and moving several areas previously under jurisdiction of 
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military courts to civilian courts (Gürsoy, “Impact” 293-294).  Overall, these episodes seemed to prove 
that the AKP had a politically motivated commitment to military reform, even as its enthusiasm for 
other EU reforms waned.  It also demonstrates the power that the AKP developed within state 
structures that formerly favored Kemalism (the judiciary), while taking almost all formal and informal 
structures of influence away from the traditional Kemalist military.   
OTHER AKP INITIATIVES: IS THIS MODERNITY? 
Reforms the AKP made in the name of the EU concerning Kurds and the military paint an 
interesting picture of AKP modernity.  It shows they made steps towards enhancing democracy as the 
EU requested, yet its overall lack of major EU reforms in other areas proves that the AKP “purposefully 
selects the areas in which it wants to further democratization for its own self-interest” (Gürsoy, 
“Changing Role” 751).  In conjunction with the EU reforms, the AKP’s time in power has been 
characterized by questionable modernity moves; a poor track record on women’s rights, an increased 
government focus on religion, corruption issues, and a decreased freedom of press, among others.  On 
top of this, this AKP also “shows signs of increasing authoritarianism in other areas” (Gürsoy, “Changing 
Role” 751).  Several other important initiatives the AKP passed (or attempted to pass) during this time 
prove the AKP capable of authoritarian tendencies (just as had the previous Kemalist elite they 
campaigned against).  Some of these amendments illustrate the AKP passing legislation to improve its 
short term political power and others bring into question the type of modernity the AKP stands for.  The 
AKP generated a new conception of modernity that was based in EU democracy and human rights, 
though part from the military reforms the AKP failed to make meaningful headway in these areas.  It is 
important to recognize that the military reforms met EU democracy requests but also reflected AKP self-
interest, and the AKP’s other major reforms for the EU were limited during this time.  Other legislation 
that has been initiated by the AKP raises questions about the party’s real conception of modernity and 
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whether or not they are still serious about EU membership.  And if the AKP is no longer concerned with 
EU membership, what is their conception of modernity outside of the shell of the EU? 
Yilmaz argues that after the second national election in 2007, the AKP was able to shift its focus 
away from the EU; “While the EU accession process provided a strong sense of legitimacy to the rule of 
the AKP, this has been replaced by the legitimacy provided by popular support in the elections across 
time” (G. Yilmaz 313).  The AKP now acted under the principle that it had earned the right to act as it 
wanted through its electoral mandate.  The EU membership question was still useful for certain 
domestic political situations, but it won its own legitimacy and now no longer felt the need to rely on 
the EU as it had in the past, unless of course, it suited domestic political needs.  While the following are 
by no means a full collection of reforms or actions, but they highlight important issues that have 
contributed to the polarization of Turkish society and politics.  These are issues that still play a role in 
the conversation around AKP and what their conception of modernity is concerning reforms that have 
little to do with the EU. 
Beginning at the period of waning EU enthusiasm, the AKP passed a new penal code in June 
2005.  Far from improving freedom of speech, this reform “stiffened penalties for the expression of non-
violent opinions deemed to insult the nation of harm national interests” (Patton 340).  This new code 
also “fell short of effectively protecting women’s rights particularly with respect to honour killings and 
virginity testing” (Patton 340).  This failure came on the heels of another women’s rights embarrassment 
at the end of 2004 when “a group of AKP deputies moved an amendment in the criminal code to define 
adultery as a criminal offence, punishable with a stiff sentence for women” (Kalaycıoğlu 273).  Such a 
move elicited a strong response from both the EU and the Council of Europe with Erdoğan “indignantly 
[telling] the EU not to interfere with Turkey’s internal affairs” (Glyptis, “Rapprochement 415).  This type 
of focus on “protecting the family” is indicative of the party’s Islamist character, and helps to define 
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what the AKP stands for outside of its profession of support for human rights and democracy within the 
context of the EU (Glyptis, “Rapprochement 415). 
Another change Turkey has seen under the AKP has been an intensified government focus on 
the importance of religion, a fight against the Kemalist definition of secularism while utilizing the 
Kemalist tool of the Presidency of Religious Affairs.  According to statistics on the organization’s official 
website, the department had around 74,000 staff in 2003, already a number that could be considered 
significant.  But by 2013, after the legislation of 2010 which upgraded and enlarged the office in line 
with “the requirements of modern management,” its staff had risen to number almost 122,000 
(“İstatistikler,” “Kuruluş”).  This is an incredible jump in a decade’s time.  This is indicative of the 
importance the government places on this office along with its increasingly visible conservatism.  The 
higher profile of the Presidency of Religious Affairs is only one avenue through which the AKP has 
worked to promote a greater importance of Islam in Turkish society.  In order to satisfy Islamist 
constituents, the AKP has had to create measures catering to their conservative wishes in order to 
maintain relevancy over parties that offer a stronger Islamist view.  This includes some incidences where 
AKP-run local governments have attempted to regulate public morality.  The specifics have included 
segregation of men and women at public swimming pools, the banning of “sexually liberal” ads for 
swimsuits on local billboards, and “the distribution of leaflets promoting a strict Islamist lifestyle,” 
among others.  These actions elicited tense backlash in some areas, prompting the national office “to 
refrain from activities that politicized religion.”  However, it is likely that such acts continued quietly 
which helps keep the party popular amongst its grassroots constituency (Patton 348).  
More obvious of the conservative religious push concerns the 2008 highly controversial 
headscarf issue.  In early 2008, the AKP passed a constitutional amendment (not within a reform 
package) that allowed female students to wear headscarves at universities (Öniş).  The stand-alone 
amendment was highly criticized, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs “asserted that Turkey dismissed the 
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headscarf ban in order to comply with EU norms” (Baudner 930).  The party had previously requested 
the involvement of the European Court of Human Rights in the matter which had not supported the 
headscarf ban repeal.  The EU publicly replied that they had made no such recommendation for the 
amendment.  The CHP brought the matter to the Turkish Constitutional Court which annulled the new 
amendment lifting the ban.  This controversy led to the chief prosecutor of the CHP case calling for the 
closure of the AKP based on its anti-secular activities, arguing the party’s acts as unconstitutional.  
However, only ten of eleven judges believed the party to be guilty, allowing the party to avoid closure 
(Baudner).   
The AKP passed several reforms from 2002-2005 and later passed further measures for a 
national strategy against corruption in 2008 in hopes of satisfying EU accession criteria.  These initiatives 
may showcase impressive work on paper, yet the actual implementation and changes in the state have 
been minimal and selective (Yılmaz and Soyaltın 14).  While corruption has always been a problem in 
Turkey, the AKP’s EU-oriented corruption reforms seem to be more for show, as “accusations of 
tolerating corruption and appointing cronies to top jobs are rife” (Glyptis, “Kemalism” 242).  The AKP is 
known to use corrupt practices such as bribes and state contracts to maintain their voter base, with the 
connection between the AKP’s neoliberal business reforms, business votes, and state contracts 
representing a large part of AKP support.  The AKP has done its best to replace the previous Kemalist 
business connections and punish those who don’t support their policies; “whenever challenged by 
secular(ist) business groups, the AKP government…opted for distributing state resources to its new allies 
and incorporating these organizations into policymaking platforms” done at the expense of powerful 
secular business organizations (Ozel 1096).  Again, this is not a unique practice to Turkey, but it is 
demonstrative of the AKP’s workings towards complete control through a mutual relationship where the 
state apparatus is utilized to gain and retain votes through patronage and incentives.   
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The AKP has claimed major corruption reform, but the Freedom in the World organization 
maintains in its 2015 report that “Corruption remains a major problem in Turkey,” specifically 
referencing the 2013 corruption allegations surrounding government ministers and the Erdoğan family 
that were documented through audio recordings released by Fethullah Gülen and his “parallel state” 
within Turkey that he accused of wanting to take over the government (Freedom in the World 2015: 
Turkey).  The recordings were made available on YouTube, making this scandal material very public and 
accessible.  Erdoğan responded with a mass “reassignment” of over 2,500 judges and prosecutors and 
45,000 polices officers (Freedom in the World 2015: Turkey).  Such a response to a very public 
corruption accusation has only raised suspicions and concerns about Erdoğan and his AKP government.  
Clearly these moves, reminiscent of the Kemalist elite, represents a clear failure of the modern reforms 
the AKP promoted. 
After the presidential crisis in 2007, the AKP pushed through another major amendment 
concerning the way the President of the Republic is elected.  This changed the semi-parliamentary 
regime to a popularly elected president.  Advocated by the AKP as being done to avoid a similar 
situation to the Gül fiasco in the future, which resulted in the e-memorandum conflict between the AKP 
and the military, Kalaycıoğlu sees the change differently; “such a shift in regime character has more to 
do with the power struggle between the AKP and the opposition than with the quality of representative 
democracy in Turkey” (268).  This issue is important as Erdoğan became Turkey’s first directly elected 
president in 2014, and has pushed for further changes to Turkey’s political structure that would only 
increase his power as president, advocating for Turkey’s move from a parliamentary system to a 
presidential system (Beki).  This change would give Erdoğan more legal power and enhance his political 
control.  Erdoğan’s brief tenure in the presidency so far has already raised certain democratic issues; the 
Turkish constitution requires that the President not be connected to any political party, and Erdoğan has 
still remained the de-facto leader of the AKP (K. Kaya). 
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Erdoğan’s increasingly authoritarian tendencies before and since his election to the presidency 
have led to numerous comparisons to Putin and others believing that he is attempting to “build a regime 
according to his wishes…being himself a mix of an Ottoman sultan and a republican president” (Sadar, 
Vatandaş).  Kalaycıoğlu has also expressed concerns over Turkey’s direction under Erdoğan, citing the 
potential outcomes such as; 
“copying and pasting an "autogolpe," experienced painfully in Peru because of former President 
Alberto Fujimori; a "delegative democracy," as in Venezuela under former President Hugo 
Chavez; or "competitive authoritarianism," symbolized by Russian President Vladimir Putin” 
(qtd. In Baydar).  
Any of these outcomes would be a serious reversal in modernity.  Proving that while still popular, 
Erdoğan’s actions have led him and the AKP to be interpreted as operating far from the EU (or any) 
conception of modernity that respects democracy.  
Through a combination of legislation, speeches, government actions and priorities, the rule of 
the AKP has also led to other important events and societal changes.  Like with corruption, Turkey has 
always had issues with freedom of press.  However, in the past few years the situation in Turkey has 
gotten much worse in this area; "the independence, impartiality and quality of media in Turkey still 
remains low” (G. Yilmaz 311).  In 2015 Turkey was ranked 149 out of 180 countries in the Reporters 
without Borders World Press Freedom Index, achieving only a slight improvement after the previous 3 
years at 154. The modest change only came after the release of 40 imprisoned journalists in 2014, but 
Reporters without Borders still concluded that “the freedom of information continues to decline.”  By 
comparison, Turkey’s score in 2005 and 2006 was 98 out of 161 respectively, early in the period of AKP 
rule.  How the state treats its media is telling of the status of modern society; “Freedom of the press is a 
benchmark for freedom of thought and speech, which are themselves hallmarks of the democratic 
freedoms that are the bedrock of modernity” (I. Kaya 205).  Because of the deteriorating freedom of 
press and speech issues in Turkey, self-censorship is rampant and those who dare insult Erdoğan are 
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increasingly targeted.  Since his election as president, 236 people have been investigated for insulting 
Erdoğan, with 105 indicated and 8 formally arrested.  Those targeted for “insulting the head of state” 
include journalists, artists, protestors, even a 16-year old high school student facing four years in prison 
if convicted and a former Miss Turkey for posting a poem to Instagram, indicating the individuals and 
lawyers filing cases on behalf of Erdoğan are willing to go after anyone in society who dares to speak 
insultingly, regardless of their position in society (Lowen). 
Also related to freedom of speech issues is the government’s targeting of online speech through 
social media mediums.  Due to their role in the Erdoğan’s corruption allegations and the 2013 Gezi Park 
protests, the government shut down access to YouTube and Twitter at different points in 2014 
(Freedom in the World: Turkey).  The Gezi Park Protests which occurred in the summer of 2013 had an 
international profile due to its size, duration, and general existence as an unusual Turkish experience.  
The protests began in Istanbul as a very small protest against an urban development plan in the popular 
Gezi Park, but grew after incidences of reported police violence.  The protests grew quickly (thanks in 
part to social media), though very few media outlets reported on their existence despite the impossible 
to ignore mass gathering in an incredibly popular, busy area of the city.  The protests continued to grow 
in size and spread to cities across Turkey, losing their meaning as a simple protest against urban 
development and instead “became a country-wide uprising against “the oppressive, arrogant and 
increasingly authoritarian” Erdoğan (Öncü 151).  The EU noted in their 2013 Progress Report on Turkey 
that “attempts to reach out to protestors were limited and overshadowed by excessive use of force by 
the police, polarizing language and an overall absence of dialogue” (2).  The protests illustrated the 
significant portion of the population who are distrusting of the AKP and Erdoğan and the current 
changes occurring in Turkey.  The protests are also significant because while smaller protests are not 
necessarily unusual, the extent of protests that began at Gezi (with smaller, yet similar protests over 
various occurrences since) is new and demonstrative of an increasingly politically vocal population.    
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Such a change in political behavior as demonstrated by the size and strength of the Gezi protests is 
indicative of those individuals’ concern; a true fear that the direction of the country is moving away 
from modernity under the leadership of Erdoğan.  Public opinion polling confirms individuals with higher 
education levels are more likely to be unsatisfied with Erdoğan and more supportive of the Gezi Park 
protests (“Turks Divided,” Sonnenschein and Srinivasan).  If a democratic acknowledgement of their 
voices is ignored, then protesting is a way to draw attention to their viewpoint, and not only within 
Turkey, but with the EU and the world as an audience.  The AKP’s response to the protests was through 
police violence and a lack of dialogue, a brushing off of the protesters as criminals.  This is not a 
response compatible with modernity.  
The cause of protests in early 2015 in Turkey stem from the murder of a young woman, which is 
indicative of the larger concern over the treatment of women in society.  As Kaya points out; “Recently 
women have been exposed to extremes of violence – harassed, kicked out of the work-place and even 
killed” (I. Kaya 206).  Compounding and potentially contributing to the increase in violence against 
women lately, is that penalties for men who these types of crimes are typically mild (Khazan).  Kaya sees 
this situation as a component of an environment of “de-modernization, a reversal of the modernization 
process” (I. Kaya 205).   While this issue may not be directly caused by the AKP, it is generally accepted 
that the last decade under the AKP rule has seen an increase in violence against women.  Though not 
definitively related to specific AKP changes, but rather the general increasingly conservative atmosphere 
that has reinforced the idea of women as second class citizens.  This atmosphere is worrisome when 
considering its implications for modernity; such a change proves that the AKP has failed to balance its 
conservative leanings with its support for democracy, a step in the wrong direction towards modernity.  
As long as these events seen as unmodern continue to occur and many understand that the AKP and 
Erdoğan have contributed to this “de-modernization,” social unrest will continue. 
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Chapter 3: Conclusion: Where is Turkish Modernity Today? 
Turkey has been considered a democracy for many years, though those familiar of its political 
situation will recognize that this comes with caveats.  Both Kemalism and the AKP have promoted their 
belief in full democracy for Turkey, but as Glyptis points out; “Democratisation, however, is a tricky 
concept.  For some in Turkey, ‘more democracy generally means more Islam’, yet for others, more Islam 
automatically means less democracy” (“Kemalism” 243).  This helps to explain why the Kemalist 
conception of modernity falls behind in the technical category of democracy, and why the AKP needed 
the EU to try and alter the state structures that restricted democracy that failed to comply with Kemalist 
modernity.  Highlighted in this way, the concept of democracy in Turkey cannot be considered without 
understanding the implications of modernity.  In fact, Turkish modernity does not just have effects on 
democracy, but essentially all political concepts and actions in Turkey.  This special connection to the 
idea of modernity goes beyond the realm of politics and permeates Turkish society, its meaning invoking 
deeply held beliefs about the Turkish state and its history and traditions.  Turkey’s problematic 
relationship with modernity and democracy, understood through battles for political control, also 
explains why Turkey has failed to achieve this elusive goal. 
As has been explored, Kemalism represented modernization through Westernization, which 
required a complete rethinking of what Turkish society meant.  Atatürk was the architect of this vision, 
and his strict belief in nationalism and secularism were the foundations for a modern, civilized society.  
Atatürk’s plans, however, have yet to realize their natural progression, which had led to a kind of 
modernity crisis in Turkey.  After decades of following the Kemalist formula, Turkish society was still 
fragmented and in conflict, with an interfering military struggling to maintain order in the face of 
perceived threats, both external and internal.  The internal struggles against Kurdish nationalism and 
Islamists led to a Kemalist elite, made up of the military, judiciary, politicians and bureaucracy, which 
was willing to restrict and limit freedoms in the name of protecting Kemalism.  But this is indicative of 
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the power of Kemalism, for those who believe in its necessity for Turkey, it is a deep, passionate belief, 
and any straying from the principles of secularism and nationalism is a threat to modernity. 
However, Kemalism had several very clear flaws, and it was these flaws that led Turkish society 
to where it is today.  Firstly, Kemalist modernization was not a naturally occurring event, and “in cases of 
elite-directed transformation…it is the state elites who have to be defeated in order for modernization-
from-above to be transcended by a full project of modernity” (Bozdoğan and Kasaba 46).  Turkey could 
never fully achieve modernity under Kemalism, especially after the beginning of the military coups.  At 
this point Atatürk’s modernization project was abandoned, and Kemalist modernity transformed into an 
idea which could be utilized for political control.  Kemalism was then promoted through this altered 
form, and these elites then began protecting the Kemalist ideology that maintained the status quo and 
alienated significant portions of the population, rather than risk the growth that would be the only way 
to fully achieve modernity.  After many decades of promises of a modern Turkey without a full 
realization of this goal, other options became more appealing in hopes that Turkey could finally be 
delivered to this dream.  The AKP offered a new voice, and a new conception of modernity that revolved 
around the EU, the very pinnacle of modernity that would finally achieve the state Atatürk had dreamed 
of.     
The AKP’s vision of modernity offered a reinterpretation of secularism that was founded on 
democracy and human rights.  The promotion of the EU by the AKP and a great push for economic 
reforms were seen as a fresh path to Turkish modernity, and this new dream was incredibly popular.  
But the AKP’s religious connection is clear break from the modernity imagined by Kemalism, but the AKP 
maintains that modernity and Islamic traditions and values are not only compatible, but necessary for 
the best interests of state and society.  In essence, the AKP created an alternative modernity to the 
previously accepted model offered by Kemalism, but as Dönmez makes clear, “these ‘alternative 
modernities’ cannot be reconciled with each other” (371).  The AKP offered Turkey a new definition of 
82 
 
modernity, one that allows Islam to be a part of government and daily life while still promoting 
“Western” goals of neoliberalism and democracy while working towards the beacon of European 
modernity; the EU.   
The AKP recognized a winning formula to satisfy those who wanted religion, those who were 
discontent with Kemalism’s authoritarianism, and those wanting Turkey to be closer to the West and 
combined these typically different voters into a single powerful voting block that had been absent in 
Turkey for many years.  In the beginning of the AKP’s tenure, the party was very effective at promoting 
itself as the carrier of Turkey’s new modernity, and its initial progress was promising;  “under the mantle 
of EU-stipulated reform, the AKP has managed to effect sweeping reforms that no other government – 
especially suspected of harboring an Islamist agenda – could have passed” (Glyptis, “Kemalism” 222).  In 
fact, the AKP made their new modernity very popular very quickly, and despite some initial flaws, the 
party with its strong leader Erdoğan developed a convincing notion of modernity that made many 
believe they would finally be the ones to deliver the country to goal.  Important to recognize is that the 
AKP is a skilled political machine and its marketing was key in its success; “By carefully picking his 
political initiatives, as well as the words he used to describe them, Erdogan managed to suggest that 
everything he does… is impeccably modern” (Danforth). 
But after examining the entire progression of the AKP up until this point, there are concerns 
surrounding the current status of the party’s modernity.  To understand the change in the AKP’s 
modernity prerogatives, it is helpful to remember that when the AKP came to power it was working 
within a Kemalist state structure.  Tombuş has a helpful model for understanding the AKP’s operations 
as a party working within a structure designed to hinder it.  Tombuş identifies that the AKP had two 
phases, the first was during its early years when it was first establishing power and removing obstacles 
to democratization.  The second phase began when the AKP had solidified its power and could finally act 
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on creating the institutional conditions for democracy, or it could use those some institutions “to 
establish its own undemocratic control” (321).  He argues that the AKP has chosen the second option.   
The initial phase of democratization was when the AKP was working against the Kemalist 
structure and for the democratic and human rights ideals it professed, following EU reforms in the name 
of its new modernity.  After the AKP successfully removed the obstacles to democratization, it had the 
opportunity to further these reforms and truly open up Turkey to full liberal democracy.  However, 
instead of following this path, “The AKP has started to replace the Kemalist authoritarianism with a 
conservative authoritarianism by using the very same state apparatuses it took over from the Kemalist 
establishment” (Tombuş 314).  The Kemalist ideology that made secularism a foundation of its 
modernity was soon replaced by a new vision, one in which “the AKP has its own authoritative impulses 
for its project of a more conservative Turkey… [where] Islam constitutes the main building block” 
(Tombuş 324).  The status of the AKP’s current modernity is different than the conception is promoted 
in its early years.  Its promotion of a true democracy has fallen through, and its actions have proven that 
the Turkish political system is distorted.  In order for one party to gain power over the embedded 
Kemalist system, it had to promote that it was wanting to change that system.  But instead of truly 
replacing the old system, it rather exchanged one system of elites with an empowering structure for 
another.  This demonstrates a clear use of a modernity as a political tool, proving that when used for 
political gain, rather than a serious goal, modernity cannot be achieved. 
The biggest issue concerning the AKP’s modernity, which can be found in both its initial and later 
conceptions, is the presence of religious conservatism with Islam as the “main building block.”  Because 
the presence of Islam is antithetical to Kemalism’s secularism, this constitutes the biggest issue 
surrounding the AKP’s conception of modernity.  This issue cannot be reconciled by Kemalists, and it is 
conservatism that has worked to deepen Turkey’s societal divide and is responsible for the social unrest.  
Kaya believes that the Turkey of recent created by the AKP and Erdoğan illustrates that “the Islamic 
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outlook is not modern” (I. Kaya 198).  Possibly a controversial theory, within the Turkish experience, his 
reasoning rings true; “Islamic actors have no problem with economic and technological developments, 
whereas they have serious problems with the cultural and political characteristics of modernity” (198, 
199).  The Kemalist modernity is the foundation of Turkish modernity, and its implications were 
economic and technological, with political features necessary to implement all features of modernity.  
Though for Atatürk, its cultural characteristics were the most important in the journey to achieving 
modernity.  Without altering Turkey’s acceptable culture, Atatürk knew that Turkey could never reach 
modernity.  So though the AKP has followed economic modernity manifested through its belief in 
capitalism, its connection with Islamic conservatism impedes “cultural and political modernity” (I. Kaya 
199).  The impediments of Islamic conservatism that keep it from being an interpretation of modernity 
are that it struggles to realize necessary components of basic modernity such as gender equality (208).  
Modernity cannot be modernity without full recognition of the necessary “modern” cultural 
recognitions. 
Along with its issues surrounding cultural modernity, the AKP’s moves away from democracy, 
the main concept it had based its modernity foundation on manifested through the EU, prove that its 
previous conception of modernity can no longer be proved true.  Without genuine prospects for Turkey 
joining the EU at this time and the AKP’s diminished EU focus, their conception of a capitalist, 
democratic modernity that respected human rights is shattered.  The AKP may still believe and market 
capitalism as their modernity, and that may be right, but “Modernity cannot be reduced to economic 
forces, because without political modernity, modernity itself could in no way emerge” (I. Kaya 204).  
Though the AKP has been democratically elected, democracy “has been reduced to the ballot box by the 
current government.”  The AKP initiates and passes laws and decisions with their majority in Parliament, 
not finding it necessary to try and make broader coalitions of support (I. Kaya 205).  Even the EU notes 
that the political climate “lacks a spirit of compromise,” and even on “socially sensitive issues” there 
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lacks “sufficient consultation and dialogue with stakeholders” before the AKP passes single-party 
decisions (EU Commission 2013).  
The authoritarian tendencies of Erdoğan and the failure of the AKP to attempt wider political 
cohesion show a general lack of concern for increased democracy, despite that being a foundation of 
the modernity they claimed they would bring to Turkey.  In fact, Turkey has received downward ratings 
for both 2014 and 2015 for democratic standards in the Freedom in the World ratings.  The organization 
summed the 2014 acts of Prime Minister and then President Erdoğan as follows: 
“Erdoğan consolidated power during the year and waged an increasingly aggressive campaign 
against democratic pluralism.  He openly demanded that media owners censor coverage or fire 
critical journalists, told the Constitutional Court he does not respect its rulings, threatened 
reporters (and rebuked women journalists) and ordered radical, even bizarre changes to the 
school curriculum” (Freedom in the World 2015) 
This does not sound like someone concerned with their democratic appeal. As leader of the AKP, the 
party is still closely associated with Erdoğan and now many see that “The AKP has come to embody the 
very flaws of Turkish politics that it had once pledged to eliminate: cronyism, repression of freedoms, 
and disregard for the rule of law” (Sadar). 
And while the EU has a much more secondary role in Turkish politics than it did when the AKP 
first came to power, their role in solidifying the AKP’s power cannot be ignored.  There is no denying 
that EU reforms helped to empower the AKP by negating the structural advantages provided to 
Kemalists.  And though opinions may be different at the moment, in the past the EU has supported the 
AKP, as the EU would naturally endorse a party that seemed willing to commit to EU reforms.  However, 
with the journey the AKP has taken and the passionate feelings that surround the party, the EU has been 
seen as taking sides, and certainly, for many who support[ed] the EU, the wrong side.  In this initial 
support for the AKP, it is also clear that the EU failed to provide a clear and credible membership plan 
for Turkey, further alienating Kemalists and providing little reason for the AKP to make serious reforms. 
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It has, like Kemalists and the AKP, failed to deliver Turkey to modernity.  As a result, the role of the EU 
since the introduction of the AKP has been to contribute to the polarization of Turkish politics and 
society, as well as “to widen and deepen the conflict between the AKP and its opponents” (Kalaycıoğlu 
277). 
Glyptis posed an interesting question while reflecting on EU demands and the domestic 
concerns surrounding them: “Could EU accession, rather than being the vindication of Atatürk’s 
modernization, actually be its undoing?” (“Kemalism” 236).  This is a serious question, because the EU 
accession process has led to deep divides in Turkish society, not to mention that at the end of 2014 only 
a mere 18% of Turks responded that they “tend to trust” the EU (Eurobarometer).  Not only has Turkey 
been humiliated by the words and actions of the EU and EU member states, but its role in the support 
and power consolidation by the AKP will be hard for many to look past.  And while the AKP maintains 
that it is still interested in EU accession, its actions hardly reflect a serious commitment.  Turkey is 
completely in limbo surrounding EU membership, and it seems clear that membership is not a close 
prospect in the near future.  Meanwhile, the processes and reforms made in the name of the EU have 
led to the purge of Kemalists from many sectors of government and the military.  The current AKP 
definition of modernity is far from Atatürk’s definition, and though many have a deep religious-like 
belief in Kemalism, the structural advantages formed by this group are now gone.  And not only are they 
gone, they have been replaced in many areas by those loyal to the AKP.  The EU is not to blame for this, 
but its role in strengthening the AKP is undeniable. 
Through tracing the AKP’s modernity path, it is clear that there is a debate concerning the 
relationship between the AKP and the EU.  For some, the AKP truly wanted Turkey to join the EU initially, 
but it was a result of the EU’s actions that the AKP stepped back from reforms.  For others, it seems 
clear that the AKP was “using the EU accession process as a tactical move without really believing in it” 
(I. Yılmaz).  Disregarding the last few years of questionable democratic moves from the AKP, and taking 
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into account that the future of the AKP could still contain a revived meaningful push for EU membership, 
it could be argued that removing the Kemalist structure hindering democracy is still a good thing.  But 
Glyptis makes the important point that means are just as important as the end, and that the whole of 
Erdoğan’s EU agenda should be considered; 
“Rather than merely reforming internal politics in order to reach the external goal of EU 
membership, he is using EU membership to mold internal politics, to “democratize” the polity in 
a non-Kemalist fashion.  One could argue that the net result is the same and the difference is 
too subtle to matter and yet intentions, perceptions and aims do matter” (“Rapprochement” 
413).  
The acknowledgement of the AKP’s questionable intentions and the concerned perceptions of the public 
about its EU reforms is important, and can be related to the polarization in Turkish society and politics 
that the AKP has contributed to.   
There is something to be said about the political opportunism potentially used by the AKP in 
reference to the EU.   With the ability of reflection, it is possible to question the motives of the AKP in 
their work with EU reforms.  These suspicions were raised early on, but weren’t exceedingly widespread, 
especially after the first few years of successful EU-oriented reform.  Many scholars addressing the AKP 
in its early years were very hopeful and impressed, though within Turkey some within Kemalist circles 
addressed their concern surrounding the sincerity of the AKP’s actions.  Today though, through 
examining the reforms the AKP chose to tackle versus those it did not combined with the present status 
of EU-Turkish relationship does create an interesting account regardless of the fact that such suspicions 
cannot be proved true.  Using outside tools for domestic political power is not a phenomena unique to 
Turkey, and neither is use of the EU in such a way.  Such concerns are only important to remember and 
address, in that such beliefs are a part of the political narrative surrounding the AKP. 
Also an essential component of the AKP’s narrative has been the role of Islam, as the AKP’s 
tenure has certainly seen an “Islamization” of Turkish politics and society (Göle and Tongdong).  But the 
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AKP has not necessarily led to an Islamic resurgence, it has only made its presence more visible.  The 
AKP has normalized, in some segments of society, the need and desire for Islam to be a part of politics.  
This development allows more conservative Muslims a more welcome place in society.  Secularists 
openly ridicule Islamists in the spirit of their ‘backward and traditional’ ways.  The polarizations between 
these two populations is very real and runs deep through society.  The middle ground of modern 
Muslims have also favored the AKP, but as things continue to change, it is possible some will be swayed 
away from the authoritarian Erdoğan and his party.  But the appeal of the AKP still remains for many; 
those who do not believe that religion must be relegated purely to the private sphere but still wish to 
participate in other modern experiences still follow their message, and this population has been served 
well by the AKP.  The Kemalist experience of modernity is about control of Islam, and firm secularists 
have contributed to this problem by a general attitude of intolerance for religion that can be felt in 
society, politics, and the media.  Kemalists conception of modernity includes strict secularism which 
simply cannot be reconciled with public religion.  But the AKP’s connection to democracy, EU, and the 
West “reflects an effort to internalize modernity without denying traditional Islamic and national values” 
(Dönmez 370).   
Modern Muslims wanted deeply to believe in the AKP and Erdoğan, and for good reason.  
Promotion of the EU with their focus on democracy and human rights is exactly what many modern 
Muslims wanted, a leader who proved that modernity as Islam were not mutually exclusive.  And though 
its current modernity may be separated from Western modernity ideals, the AKP has still contributed to 
society in an important way.  The AKP’s time in office has coincided with a flourishing economy, an 
increase in per capita income, and high levels of foreign direct investment (Aknur).  With the huge 
success of the economy, it is hard to deny this benefit of political stability.  The AKP has also improved 
access to social services (though through grassroots work and charities) as well as improved 
infrastructure.  The AKP’s economic success has also contributed to its ability to implement greater 
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modernization of rural areas, including the improvement of things like roads and hospitals.  These are 
undeniable benefits of the AKP, and they are directly related to their electoral successes.   
Given the AKP’s most recent vote share in the 2011 elections and Erdoğan’s subsequent earning 
of half of the presidential votes in 2014, it is almost as if Turkish politics has been evenly divided and is 
now completely polarized.  Recent public opinion surveys have helped to prove the very serious divide in 
Turkey.  In the Spring of 2014 a Pew Research Center Poll found that 51% of Turks were dissatisfied with 
the direction of the country and 44% were satisfied.  This trend has been relatively steady since 2011, 
with society’s opinions split down the middle.  Also telling is the fact that women are slightly less 
satisfied with the country’s direction than men and only 26% of those who hardly ever pray are satisfied, 
highlighting that women and more secular individuals are less happy with the current regime.  Similarly, 
44% of the country believes the national government is having a bad effect on the country with 51% 
believing it to have a good influence.  Concerning Erdoğan, the poll was split evenly at 48% for each side 
finding him to have a good and bad influence.  The highly visible and critical Gezi Park protests saw 
about 49% of people saying they supported the anti-government protests with a strong 40% opposing 
them (“Turks Divided”).  These differences also give way to divides over Islam in politics, with 69% of 
Turks believing that Islam plays a large political role in Turkey, up from 45% believing the same in 2002 
when the AKP was first elected.  Of those who think it plays a large role, 47% believe this to be a good 
thing while 40% find it to be a bad thing (“Turks Divided”).  Further evidence of the divide in society, a 
Turkey-based survey group MetroPOLL examined certain beliefs concerning religion and together with 
the Pew survey showed that piousness and the main political party that Turks supported drew clear 
distinctions in their beliefs surrounding politics, religion, and secularism.  Interestingly, the MetroPOLL 
found that 71% of respondents believe Turkey should be secular, with a robust 19% believing that the 
state should not be secular (Zibak).   
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The next election cycle will be the summer of 2015, and the outcome will be telling.  With 
Erdoğan as the Turkish president, his role is solidified until at least 2019, but whether or not the AKP will 
continue its electoral reign is unknown.  Anger and unrest at Erdoğan and the AKP has grown steadily 
and remains heated only months before the next national elections.  But the power and support of the 
AKP remains strong, and it is yet to be seen if societal discontent by a large, vocal portion of the 
population has grown strong enough to affect their solid voting bloc.  By this point, the AKP will have a 
difficult time selling its previous version of modernity, and likely equally as difficult of time marketing 
itself as reformers concerned with the EU (though they still maintain that full EU membership is a 
“strategic goal” of the party) (AKParti).    
For some voters who previously supported the AKP, it is clear that the party has taken a turn 
that they can no longer support.  Mustafa Akyol, a contributor for the International New York Times and 
regular columnist in several other publications including the Hurriyet Daily News where he recently 
shared his story; “Confessions of a Recovering ‘Erdoğan Enabler.’”  He discusses that he does not regret 
his past support for the party, claiming that during the party’s early years, “anybody who wanted to see 
a more liberal and democratic Turkey could easily see light in the AKP rather than its political rivals.”  He 
discusses their support for minority rights, freedom of speech, free markets, and the EU, stating that 
“The fact that these liberal causes were championed by a party of conservative Muslims made me only 
even more enthusiastic.”  However, he acknowledges that power corrupted the AKP, and that the EU 
reforms were adopted for “pragmatic reasons – such as saving his rule from the wrath of secularist 
generals.”  He finishes that today he is disappointed by how the AKP has turned out, though poignantly 
clarifying; “But unlike the hard-core secularists in Turkey… I never had a problem with who they were.  
Rather, I looked at what they did.  And as what they did changed over time, so did my views.” 
Aykol is an example of a moderate (or conservative) Muslim who saw no problem with the AKP’s 
religiosity and Islamist influence in government.  He acknowledges, however, that he can no longer 
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support the AKP, not withdrawing support based the religious/secular divide, but on the principle that 
the AKP is not who they said were.  Turkey’s relationship with the EU, democracy, and freedom of 
speech have greatly suffered under recent AKP rule, and this will certainly affect they party’s vote share, 
though it is to be seen if the extent will be major or minor.  Nonetheless, the AKP and “an ever more 
authoritarian Erdoğan has managed to maintain the support of his religiously conservative based while 
increasingly emphasizing piety over democracy” (Danforth).  And so for some voters, given the AKP’s 
past actions and statements, the neglect of democracy might not matter to those who have benefited 
from the AKP or those who feel strongly that Erdoğan is not an authoritarian president, but a strong 
leader who is guiding Turkey down a path of morals and recognizing a different historical mandate than 
the previous model provided by Kemalism that simply failed to deliver.   
For those still unhappy about the tenure of the AKP, their concerns about Turkish society boil 
down to the question of modernity.  For Kemalists, modernity and secularism must go together, there is 
no exception to this rule.  For the AKP, Turkey can be both modern and Muslim.  These two visions of 
modernity, along with their debates about the military, minorities, and the EU have created a tense 
domestic environment.  For those believing in the foundation of Kemalist modernity that Turkey was 
founded on cannot reconcile the AKP’s actions and presence.  There is a true fear that Turkey’s progress 
towards modernity will be pulled back, leaving a state that may have a free market economy, but with a 
society that is socially repressive and completely incompatible with the European social model that 
Atatürk planned for his country.  For Kemalists, the result of 12 years of AKP rule is the embodiment of 
all the anxieties Atatürk warned Turkey needed to be protected from.  On the other hand, religious 
individuals who find the AKP’s message of Islamic guiding morals to be the only modernity compatible 
with their way of life.  It is truly of a tale of two very different Turkeys.  
Kemalist modernity does not allow for exclusions or exceptions.  It perceived modernity as a 
linear journey, and the AKP has created a serious rupture along this path.  Secularization was an 
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essential component to modernity, in Atatürk’s view, it was the largest barrier to Turkey’s modern 
future.  The AKP presented itself as a party committed to the secular regime, but its rule has created a 
society that where Islam’s importance is elevated, and has become much more socially conservative.  
This society has strayed from Atatürk’s conception of modernity due to the AKP’s negation of some of 
Turkey’s most important secular elements.  However, the hegemony of the AKP has ushered in this new 
society, and many of their supporters feel this new reality better fits their religious profiles.  Kemalism’s 
grasp has slipped and these religiously conservative citizens now have more power, and they recognize 
this control and will be unlikely to relinquish it.  This change has been startling for Turkey’s secular 
middle class, including those who may not have considered themselves strict Kemalists previously.  
The AKP promoted itself as a new conception of Turkish modernity; one that respected 
democracy and human rights through Turkey’s membership in the EU.  The AKP brought Turkey closer to 
this goal, but the steam behind these reforms gave out, and many believed that the old Turkish politics 
had returned.  But even this conception was incorrect.  The AKP was not offering a return to former 
Turkish politics.  The AKP, during which time it completed many democratic reforms hoping to meet the 
EU requirements and deliver Turkey to the cusp of modernity, was actually creating a new modus 
operandi in Turkish politics.  No doubt adopting the EU reforms was a political move, but it cannot be 
determined that the AKP was disingenuous in its initial push for reforms.  However, through examining 
the AKP’s specific reforms and actions, it seemingly highlights a much different party than the Western 
oriented party it claimed to be.  Its definition of modernity began to clash with the Kemalist definition of 
modernity that Turkish society had come to expect, and the AKP’s EU reforms started making serious 
changes to the Kemalist establishment.   
Kemalism may have been subdued and its presence in government neglected, but its ideology is 
not dead.  Though the military has lost its ability to step in and restore this Kemalist vision, the dream of 
Kemalist secularism and modernity is still alive and very much sought after by a still significant portion of 
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the population.  The new power in Turkey has made quick work to fundamentally change the system, 
utilizing the same mentality and tools as Atatürk did when he first introduced his project; 
“whether by rational overlords or by religious tyrants, who seem to be resourceful enough to 
emulate the ways of modern political control for their own brand of despotism, modernity 
appears to be a key factor” (Polat 652). 
Modernity is an incredibly powerful political tool in Turkey.  It has had unparalleled success at 
maintaining the Kemalist dream, and its potential was recognized by others looking to upend the status 
quo.  And so Turkish modernity was adapted from Kemalism and then used against it.  The AKP’s new 
modernity offered Turkey something new, and in its name the Kemalist structure has been chipped 
away.  But instead of completing a new vision, offering Turkey full liberal democracy for the first time, 
the AKP used its tool to cement itself in power. 
The general air of societal distrust and intolerance generating by the changes made under AKP 
rule, however, would not be possible without the general flaws in both the AKP and Kemalist versions of 
modernity.  Kemalism, with its authoritarian, ethnically homogenous and strictly secular viewpoint of 
Turkish modernity failed to allow for exceptions or leniency and so its implementation failed to stand 
with time.  Instead of delivering Turkey to modernity, the Kemalist elite preferred to keep Turkey “safe,” 
and its institutions alienated liberals and conservative Muslims alike.  But the AKP has equal flaws.  Its 
failure to balance its conservatism with democracy has led to the authoritarian tendencies it claimed to 
be fighting against.  It has seemingly stopped reaching for the goal of EU membership and its cultural 
policies tend to demonstrate a reversal of modernization.   
This overview of Kemalism and the AKP, the two most popular and important benefactors of 
Turkish modernity prove that there has been no true political project based on modernization or 
democratization in Turkey.  Both parties offered modernity that they utilized as a political tool, rather 
than a genuine goal for the country.  When used in this way, modernity cannot be achieved, because 
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true modernity and full democracy cannot ensure continued political power, and both the AKP and 
Kemalism have been unwilling to relinquish this position of power.  Understanding these complexities of 
Turkish domestic politics, the EU has failed to improve the situation of modernity, and has in fact 
worsened the political and social polarizations deeply affecting the country.  The EU failure to provide a 
clear, credible path to membership for Turkey has also proven itself incapable of delivering modernity.  
Whether the AKP retains its 50 percent vote share and remains in power after the 2015 national 
elections will be telling about which modernity Turkish citizens are looking for, but currently it is unclear.  
True modernity and democracy must be a naturally occurring process from the ground level, and recent 
moves such as the Gezi Park protests and the women’s movement are steps in this direction.  Things are 
currently changing in Turkey, and with the Kemalist structure removed, the elections in June will be 
indicative about what next moves are possible.  Still at the present moment, the great Turkish modernity 
debate is still raging, and the biggest loser is democracy.   
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